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AN EXERCISE IN SOCIOLOGICAL JURISPRUDENCE:
HEREIN THE SIGNAL THEORY
BURTON F. BRODY*
INTRODUCTIONTE fourth sentence of Oliver Wendell Holmes' monumental
study of the common law states the fundamental tenet of the
sociological school of jurisprudence. There the young Holmes
said:
The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience. The felt necessi-
ties of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of public policy,
avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share with their fellow-
men, have had a good deal more to do than the syllogism in determining the rules
by which men should be governed. The law embodies the story of a nation's
development through many centuries, and it cannot be dealt with as if it contained
only the axioms and corrollaries of a book of mathematics. In order to know
what it is, we must know what it has been, and what it tends to become. 1
Sixteen years later in 1897, Holmes then a Justice of the Supreme
Court of Massachusetts, persisted in his beliefs about the study of
law. He stated:
The rational study of law is still to a large extent the study of history. History
must be a part of the study, because without it we cannot know the precise scope
of rules which it is our business to know . . . . For the rational study of the law
the black-letter man may be the man of the present, but the man of the future is
the man of statistics and the master of economics. It is revolting to have no
better reason for the rule of law than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry
IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds upon which it laid down have vanished
long since, and the rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past.
2
It has been observed that Holmes' beliefs about the analysis of
the law are equally applicable to other social activities.' His pejora-
tive assessment of the value of logic was merely an expression of his
beliefs that the rigid syllogistic forms of Aristotelian logic were in-
adequate tools of social analysis. And as such, his work was the
* MR. BRODY received his B.S.C. from De Paul University College of Com-
merce in 1959, and his J.D. from De Paul University College of Law in 1961. He
is presently a member of the Illinois Bar, and an Associate Professor of Law at the
University of Denver College of Law.
1. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAw, (Howe ed. 1963).
2. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REv. 457, 469 (1897).
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first in a series of innovative analyses of other social phenomena
such as history, politics, philosophy and economics. 4
Later, Dean Roscoe Pound gave formal structure to Holmes' germi-
nal beliefs, setting forth the boundaries of the sociological school of
jurisprudence. 5 He stated that one of the activities of this school
of jurisprudence is to ascertain the social, economic, moral, political
and psychological conditions out of which law evolves. The wisdom
and efficacy of such analysis has not been, nor can it be, denied.
However, the very readiness of its acceptance has militated against
its widespread application to fundamental concepts of our laws.
It is the purpose of this paper to demonstrate the validity of the
sociological analysis by applying it to the "doctrine of considera-
tion" in contract law. However, one is constrained to admit, that
another proof of the truths of sociological jurisprudence is insufficient
reason to engage in this effort. A more profitable objective is to
use the teachings of sociological jurisprudence to articulate a doc-
trine of consideration that can have meaning to students of the law.
There are two reasons that the doctrine of consideration is a particu-
arly appropriate subject of sociological analysis. First, because it is a
basic concept whose beginning marks the beginning of a new era of
Anglo-American law. And second, because in its present state it is
a product of the kind of logical analysis that sociological jurispru-
dence finds totally inadequate. Therefore, the potential of under-
standing promised by a sociological analysis of consideration justi-
fies the effort.
THE PRESENT DOCTRINE
Section Two of The Restatement of Contracts defines a promise
as "[A]n undertaking, however expressed, either that something
shall happen, or that something shall not happen, in the future."'
However, the Restatement first states that a contract is, "A promise or
set of promises for the breach of which the law gives a remedy, or the
performance of which the law recognizes as a duty."7  The concept
4. Id. at 15.
5. Pound, The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence, 25 HItv. L.
REV. 489 (1912).
6. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 2 (1933).
7. Id. at§ 1.
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which converts promises into contracts is, of course, consideration,
and as such is the sine qua non of contract doctrine. It, therefore,
has momentous effect.
The clauses, "the law gives a remedy," and "the law in some way
recognizes as a duty," are innocent enough to modem minds, espe-
cially minds devoted to legal study, but when viewed in their histori-
cal context they are pregnant statements. It is far too easy for contem-
porary scholarship to overlook the painstaking development of legal
remedies. Ignoring, for the moment, the social changes which have
been wrought and focusing only on the evolution of legal doc-
trine, one must still concede that the present sophisticated set of
legal remedies results from an enduring effort to overcome primitive
anarchy and medieval narrow-mindedness. Respect for this struggle
should by itself militate against taking too lightly the clause, "the law
gives a remedy."
More significantly, because the struggle to create effective means
of righting wrongs is for the most part in the past, there is a tendency
to overlook what is today merely implicit, but was in earlier times
most explicit, when legal doctrine dictates a remedy. "The law gives
a remedy," carries with it, in theory at least, the very real possibility
that the executive branch of government, in fulfilling its obligation
to enforce judicial decisions, will use physical force.8  This use of
force in a civilization which has so fervently sought to rise above the
directness of instinctive justice is a step not readily authorized; even
though that step is in the overwhelming majority of instances merely
a theoretical one.
The plea remains timely because there are promises which seem-
ingly conform to accepted definitions, but are not contracts.9 And
on the other hand, there are promises for which exceptions to ac-
cepted doctrine have been forged so that they may be enforced. 10
8. Supra note 2.
9. See, e.g., fungible goods cases: Standard Bank of Canada v. Lowman, 1
F.2d 935, 940 (W.D. Wash. 1924); Edwards v. Cleveland Mill and Power Co.,
193 N.C. 780, 138 S.E. 131, 134 (1927); see also, accord and satisfaction cases:
Rogers v. Spokane, 9 Wash. 168, 37 P. 300 (1894); Continental Nat'l Bank v.
McGeoch, 92 Wis. 286, 66 N.W. 606 (1896).
10. Supra note 6, at § 86: Byerly v. Duke Power Co., 217 F.2d 803, 806 (4th
Cir. 1954); Levin v. Diamond State Poultry Co., 175 F. Supp. 851, 854 (D. Del.
1959); supra note 6, at § 87: Howard v. Zilch, 346 Mass. 33, 190 N.E.2d 77, 78
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What is worse is that in neither class of cases are the results ones
which conflict with a reasonable sense of justice; the sharpest criti-
cism that can be made is that the decisions contradict accepted the-
ory. Therefore, it would seem the difficulty is not one of under-
standing but rather articulation. Professor Llewellyn pinpointed the
problem in evaluating a symposium on the doctrine:
As we have seen, 'Consideration' is a vast, sprawling field, with part of its roots
hopelessly intertangled with other roots from other phases of our law, in ways
which show clearly enough in work and result, but which do not show clearly in
most discussion."
THE SHORTCOMINGS OF PRESENT DEFINITIONS
Current statements of the doctrine of consideration merely de-
scribe each phenomenon that has ever constituted consideration.
However, such definitions provide insufficient guidance for predict-
ing future developments and decisions because they fail to reveal
why each such phenomenon has been deemed adequate considera-
tion. Therefore, even though everyone is totally aware of what con-
sideration does and knows each component constituting considera-
tion, no one is quite sure what consideration is.
The Causes
The causes for the inadequate explanation of the doctrine are sub-
tle, distinct and yet intertwined. The major reason has been that
the efforts to distill a doctrine have, for the most part, been ex-
pended in a vacuum.' 2 The documentation of authority has been
monumental and the analysis of legal theory has been no less than
brilliant. However, there has been little attempt to relate legal rea-
soning to the civilization which gave rise to it. In other words, the
impact of sociological jurisprudence has been slight. The examina-
tion of social forces has not generally been deemed within the scope
of contract scholarship. Therefore, because law is only a part-al-
(1963); Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Szymanski, 207 Misc. 130 (1954); supra note
6, at § 89: Byerly v. Duke Power Co., id. at 806; supra note 6, at § 90: Stevens v.
G.L. Rugo and Sons Inc., 209 F.2d 135, 143 (1st Cir. 1954).
11. Llewellyn, Common Law Reform of Consideration: Are there Measures?
41 COLUM, L. REV. 863 (1941).
12. Shatwell, The Doctrine of Consideration in the Modern Law, 1 SYDNEY L.
REV. 289 (1954).
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beit a significant part-of a culture, the contract scholarship which
ignored the other facets of the culture must perforce fall short of total
understanding. As a result of the disinclination to place developing
doctrine in the various social and economic environs through which
it has passed, the analysis of consideration has not penetrated to the
essence of the doctrine.
Human Nature
Another cause of the failure to definitively articulate a fully satis-
fying consideration doctrine flows from the nature of man. Legal
scholars, as a result of the very human need to feel that man has some-
how improved the world he inhabits, underestimated earlier contract
systems. Sir Henry Maine, a preeminent legal historian commits
this subtle sin when he describes the operation of an ancient body of
contract doctrine:
That which the law arms with its sanctions is not a promise, but a promise accom-
panied with a solemn ceremonial. Not only are the formalities of equal im-
portance with the promise itself, but they are, if anything, of greater importance;
for that delicate analysis which mature jurisprudence applies to the conditions of
mind under which a particular verbal assent is given appears, in ancient law, to be
transferred to the words and gestures of the accompanying performance.1
Another equally eminent scholar exhibits the same hindsighted
smugness about the development of contract theory when he states:
English law started from a groundwork of archaic Germanic ideas not unlike those
of early Roman law, and quite unrelated to the common sense of a modem man of
business. Form and ceremony were everything, substance and intention were nothing
or almost nothing. Only those transactions were recognized as having legal
efficacy which fulfilled certain conditions of form, and could be established by one
or the other of certain rigidly defined modes of proof. The proof itself was
formal and, when once duly made, conclusive. The history of this branch of our
law, through the Middle Ages and even later, consists of the transition from the
ancient to the modern way of thinking.14
So motivated, scholars seeking to set forth a doctrine of consider-
ation did not see the true relationship between primitive and con-
temporary legal systems. Further their very human need to find
qualitative, substantive improvement through the ages not only led
them to misinterpret primitive contracts, but more significantly did
13. MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 303 (4th Amer. ed. from 10th London ed. 1906)
(Emphasis added).
14. POLLOCK, PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT 135 (7th ed. 1902) (Emphasis added).
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not permit them to see contemporary theory in true perspective.
Thus, once again, it is not surprising that to this point no totally
satisfactory statement of the doctrine of consideration has been made.
Resulting Cause
Still another cause of the imperfect recitals of a consideration doc-
trine flows from a combination of the prior two causes. Dean Shat-
well succinctly describes the results of the delicate combination of ig-
noring societal influences on the law with underestimating the so-
phistication of earlier contract theory. He says:
Firstly, although the doctrine of consideration was accepted as authoritatively
imposed upon the English Courts, there was as there still is, a tendency to regard
it as a legacy from the past, to accept it as a burden imposed irretrievably by past
authority rooted in the procedural structure of the common law and thus to lose
sight of its substantive purpose of bringing together under a single test of validity a
wide range of economic dealings which possessed only the common element of
bargain. With this fatalistic acceptance of consideration went also a tendency to
push analysis of the doctrine itself to a level of abstraction, to make sort of
analysis in vacuo which substituted logical deduction from definition in place of
induction from the whole context of the doctrine on bargain. 15
In this manner, the attempt to recite a doctrine of consideration
became the pursuit of an intellectually symmetrical doctrine, regard-
less of whether that symmetry existed in the enterprises of man.
Thought was dictated by the desire to define, and therefore a defi-
nition came into existence without regard for its utility. The inade-
quacy of deductive reasoning as the exclusive means of social analysis
has already been discussed. Suffice it to say that the keystone re-
search on consideration was unaffected by the revolt against Aris-
totelian logic.
THE RESULT
The consequence of these causes and others has been that the
present statements of the doctrine of consideration constitute a para-
digm rather than a definition that promotes understanding and fa-
cilitates prediction. The effect of giving the highest priority to
achieving logical harmony has been the obfuscation of the true goals
sought by civilization through its system of contracts. That this re-
sults from the pursuit of logical symmetry has been definitively dem-
15. Supra note 12, at 313.
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onstrated by Professor Fuller in The Reliance Interest In Contract
Damages.6 That article points out that although standard contract
theory espouses only the protection of the "expectancy interest," An-
glo-American courts have long guarded the "restitution" and "re-
liance" interests as well. It shows how either the concept of "ex-
pectancy" has been restructured to accommodate "reliance;" or what
is worse, how a miscarriage of justice occurred because a court was
unwilling or unable to see "reliance and restitution" as within the
minor premise of the contracts syllogism which limited itself ex-
clusively to "expectancy". Chapter four of the Tentative Draft of
The Restatement of Contracts, Second is an attempt to postulate
a consideration doctrine that will accurately reflect court action. 7
The goal of this paper is to articulate why courts have acted as they
have. And from that understanding, postulate a consideration doc-
trine which will facilitate accurate deductive application.
REMEDYING THE INADEQUACIES
To begin the task of perfecting a truly useful definition of consid-
eration several altered approaches are required. First, in order to
take fullest advantage of the view afforded by the times, contracts,
and therefore consideration, must not be limited to the somewhat
narrow theoretical rubric assigned it by traditional legal scholarship.
Rather, contract must be scrutinized in its more basic function as the
institutional enforcement of voluntarily assumed obligations.' 8  From
this perspective it is possible to see the philosophical teachings of
contract theory permeating other areas of law traditionally deemed
distinct. And thus, a fuller appreciation of contract will be fostered.
Further, a complete understanding of consideration can only
come if contract is viewed as a social activity rather than as a mere
16. Fuller & Perdue, 46 YALE L.J. 52, 373 (1936-37).
17. There is no doubt that Chapter Four achieves its goal. In thirty-nine
sessions with comments covering two hundred fifty pages. The tentative draft most
accurately analyzes decisions and legislation. However, the draft fails to articulate
the principle which cuts across all this institutional activity; therefore while it is an
improvement over earlier statements of a doctrine it too fails to fully satiate the
quest for understanding.
18. Contra, FRIEDMAN, CONTRACT LAW IN AMERICA 17 (1965), where contract
is limited to those agreements not subject "to special legal treatment . . . of special
statute or legal rule . . ." The results of this somewhat narrowed view are pointed
out in Childres, Book Review, 18 J. LEGAL ED. 478 (1966).
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legal device. By viewing a contract as it serves society, its true sig-
nificance can be seen. By placing, in a general way, each phase of
the evolving doctrine in its proper social and economic setting, a bet-
ter understanding of consideration can be had.
In addition to the two general changes in approach suggested, a
very specific, somewhat drastic modification of thinking is required.
The distinction between formal and informal contracts must be for-
gotten, and attention directed to the concept of promissary obliga-
tion that these categories were created to serve. 19
The distinction between formal and informal contracts is a par-
ticularly inhibiting result of the need to find progress. Ritualism
was and is associated with primitive societies. Scholars tend to
equate the meager technology of a primitive society with a lack of
sophistication in human affairs. As a result, legal scholars, sur-
rounded by highly developed technology, studying ancient contracts,
had no difficulty dismissing such systems as quaint and finding con-
temporary systems infinitely intellectually superior. Scholars found
a difference in kind when all that probably had taken place was a
change in degree.
Formal contracts were dismissed as somewhat mystically validated
by anachronistic ritual totally incapable of rational comprehension.
Researchers concluded that the modern era had reached a higher
plateau of theory because the means of binding a promise had be-
come less ritualistic. Their certainty about the advance of civiliza-
tion did not permit them to see that instead of the elimination of
ritual, what in fact had happened was the substitution of a contem-
porary rite for an ancient one. A ritual relevant to a modem society
had replaced a ceremony whose significance had been lost in an-
tiquity. The change in ceremony was regarded as the eradication of
ritual. Thus, they found their own times had developed contract
theory to the point where "substance" substituted for "form."2
The distinction resulting from the pejorative assessment of ancient
systems has hindered the understanding of consideration because it
19. HOLDSWORTH, THE MODERN HISTORY OF THE DOCTRINE OF CONSIDERATION,
SELECTED READINGS ON THE LAW OF CONTRACT 61, 100 (1932). See also 2
BOSTON U. L. REV. 87, 174 (1922).
20. Supra notes 13 and 14.
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has prevented students of the subject from seeing the doctrine in full
light. Formal contracts have been treated as substantively distinct
from informal ones, and as such almost totally ignored. The effort
to enunciate a doctrine of consideration has limited its search to in-
formal contracts because formal contracts and the doctrine of con-
sideration were thought to be contradictory concepts. Therefore,
attempts to recite a doctrine of consideration have been restricted to
only a part of the subject. It is no wonder that such a limited per-
spective has yielded less than satisfactory results. Forgetting the
specious distinction between informal and formal contracts causes
the contemporary theorist to surrender a small portion of self-esteem,
but in so doing he gains the portals of understanding.
As a result of ending the distinction between formal and in-
formal contracts and further expanding the view of contract to in-
clude most voluntarily assumed obligation, the full impact of contract
as a body of societal problem-solving experience begins to emerge.
Then by seeing the effect social evolution had on the doctrine of con-
sideration, a basic understanding of the doctrince becomes possible.
When consideration is viewed in its socially relevant role a definition,
basic enough to include cases that traditional doctrine has hereto-
fore handled by way of exception, can be wrought. Only by seeing
the entire doctrine of consideration in its complete social setting, cou-
pled with an understanding of contract as a social phenomenon, can
a definition of consideration that will facilitate future decision be ar-
ticulated.
It seems proper to note at this point that there is no attempt to
slide by or gloss over a questionable point in requesting the banish-
ment of the distinction between formal and informal contracts.
Quite the contrary is probably true; driving that distinction from cur-
rent contract theory may be all this paper accomplishes. The estab-
lishment of the SIGNAL THEORY of necessity requires demon-
strating that the so-called modem doctrines of consideration, i.e., the
bargained-for and detriment/benefits theories, are merely modem
counterparts of the Germanic wed and borh. Much is asked of the
reader, but nothing equal in difficulty to thinking of himself as not a
great deal more astute than peoples our civilization long has re-
garded as primitive and uncultured.
1971] 799
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SOCIAL UTILITY OF THE DOCTRINE
Investigating the contributions of the doctrine of consideration
to the social order of the common law countries reveals a great deal
about the doctrine. Knowledge of the social functions of considera-
tion discloses the components of the doctrine. More importantly,
awareness of the services rendered by the doctrine in the past indi-
cates what our society will expect of it in the future. And, recog-
nition of what has been, is and will be demanded of it gives great in-
sight to what it is and what it can and must become.
ECONOMIC CONTROL
In a society committed to free enterprise, the doctrine of consid-
eration provided civil authority with one means of controlling econ-
nomic activity.2 ' The government through its judicial branch, by es-
tablishing a doctrine that made possible the enforcement of only
some promises, subtly acquired control of entrepenurial activity. Us-
ing consideration to mark off the limits of acceptable economic ac-
tivity, the law encouraged economic acts within the bounds of the
doctrine and discouraged acts outside the pale of it.
As an example of this function of consideration, ponder the rela-
tively disreputable status of gifts in Anglo-American law and
mores." Has the doctrine of consideration so encouraged trans-
actions in which there is an exchange, that popular suspicion sur-
rounds transactions without exchange? One is at least constrained
to admit that in an adversary proceeding, a promisee where considera-
tion exists has an easier burden than a donee. To further ex-
plore this function of consideration one might simply ponder the neg-
ative implications and connotations of the word "gratuitous" which
in its positive sense flows from among the highest motivations known
to western culture.
This control function of the doctrine went unnoticed because at
first the courts were in all likelihood unaware of the economic con-
sequences of their decisions. On the other hand, even if they had
realized their ability to influence economic activity, prudence would
21. KESSLER and SHARP, CONTRACTS CASES AND MATERIALS, 1-9 (1953).
22. It is admitted that this example smacks of "which came first, the chicken or
the egg?" but it may serve to quickly clarify the point.
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have silenced any judicial affirmations of such power. The emerg-
ing law of contracts was closely related to a firm belief in the wisdom
of private control of enterprise. Therefore, discretion being a bet-
ter part of valor, the courts would have been wise not to flaunt their
power over economic activity.
ONLY SOME PROMISES
The proposition that it would be unwise for a society to enforce
each and every promise has been thoroughly examined. Among
other problems, a society that attempted total enforcement of each
promise made would have no time for anything else. Therefore, each
society must decide what kinds of promises shall become the concern
of civil authority and which types shall remain a matter solely
for private concern. The doctrine of consideration, unique to An-
glo-American law, has served as the means of establishing this initial
dichotomy.
The common law traditions of individual liberties dictated-
whether knowingly or unknowingly-that the law would let the peo-
ple decide exactly which classes of promises ought to be enforced.24
Civil authority determined the significance of the promise by ob-
serving whether or not the parties most intimately concerned with
that promise deemed it important enough to demand and give some-
thing in exchange for it. Thus, consideration became a criterion for
separating those types of promises with which society should con-
cern itself, from those promises which for any number of reasons it
might be wisest that society ignore.
BINDING PROMISES
The third social function of consideration is the one upon which
the study of contract law has traditionally concentrated. That func-
tion is that of determining in particular cases whether or not a promise
23. Willis, Rationale of the Law of Contracts, 11 IND. L.J. 227 (1935), Cohen,
The Basis of Contract, 46 Harv. L. Rev. 572-74 (1933).
24. Davis, Letting Affected Parties Communicate Standards-Exempt Property,
53 IowA L. REV. 366 (1967); Davis, Effect of Employer Approval on Workmens
Compensation Decisions-Letting Affected Parties Communicate Standards, 54
CORNELL L. REV. 97 (1968); Davis, Letting the Conduct of Affected Parties
Play a Meaningful Role in Resolving Disputes Between Adjoining and Concurrent
Owners of Real Property, 22 ARK. L. REV. 1 (1968).
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shall be binding. Here again, it is understandable that a legal system
of a society devoted to the principle of individual freedom would look
to the promisor himself to make this decision. In such an individ-
ualistic society, the question whether to enforce a particular promise
was quite naturally answered, "Only if the promisor wants it en-
forced." By inspecting the facts and finding what came to be called
consideration, the courts could be satisfied that the promisor desired
his promise enforced.
The reason the doctrine of consideration has such great social
utility, and although difficult to master, it remains readily accepted,
is because at all times the doctrine coincided with the then current
values. The very flexibility that makes the doctrine difficult is ex-
actly what makes it valuable. It is only by following the sometimes
winding path of the development of the doctrine that a firm, con-
sistent, almost constant first principle of consideration can be found.
AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
The relationship of modern contracts to ancient systems has long
been recognized. In the pursuit of knowledge of modem contracts,
the intricacies of ancient systems have been laid bare. However,
as meticulous as these historical studies have been, none of the studies
have emphasized the problems which the particular civilization was
confronting as it created its system of enforceable voluntary obliga-
tions. The historical sketch set forth here is not meant to be ex-
haustive, but introductive. Greatest insight can be achieved by
pondering modern practices as one browses ancient ones. One may
then see the similarity of problems confronting ancient and contem-
porary civilizations. Thus, one comes to realize that the changes
which have taken place flow not from changing theory, but rather
from changes in the techniques of communication, recordation,
transportation and most of all, commerce.
Candor demands the recognition that while there is no attempt to
mislead, there is a very real tendency to give prominence to those
points at which the similarity is most patent. This tendency flows not
from a desire to deceive, but rather from the desire to communi-
cate those factors which have contributed to the particular view of




There can be little doubt that the Anglo-Saxon tradition did in fact
have considerable influence on the common law. To believe other-
wise is to ignore five centuries of Saxon rule and limit the legal history
of England as starting from an invasion by a Frenchman. While such
a limitation has been thought convenient, some doubt must be ex-
pressed as to its validity. For even if a conqueror as esteemed as
William could change the legal system overnight, there remains the
matter of eliminating rather widely held folk habits of half a millen-
nium's duration. To think that every trace of the Anglo-Saxon com-
mercial system could be ended with such finality, is to credit William
with greater efficiency than modem dictators, using vast communi-
cations networks, have been able to achieve. Saxon law has influ-
enced the evolution of the common law at least to the extent that it
created traditional forms of social conduct upon which our system
expands.
The Efficacy of Saxon Obligations
The enforceability of Saxon contracts was based on a system of
sureties that had come into being as part of the attempt by civil
authorities to replace the physical revenge of instinctive justice with
a procedure more in keeping with the demands of an organized so-
ciety. 5 To limit privately determined and privately executed ven-
geance to tolerable levels, Saxon government provided substitute
remedies and a system for enforcing them. They implemented wer-
gelds; a set figure to be paid to the kin of the deceased by the slayer.2 6
To guarantee appearance in and compliance with the court, and thus
placate the bloodlust of the injured family, the accused was required
to give borh (sureties).27
The unique nature of Saxon suretyship, the primary liability of the
surety, guaranteed justice would be done .2  The primary liability
25. Laughlin, The Anglo-Saxon Procedure, in EssAYS IN ANGLO-SAXON LAW
183 (1876). For an in-depth analysis of Anglo-Saxon contract law see Brody,
Anglo-Saxon Contract Law: A Social Analysis, 19 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW 270
(1969).
26. THORPE, ANCIENT LAWS AND INSTITUTES OF ENGLAND, 31-33 (1840).
27. The Laws of Heathar and Eadric §§ 8, 10 in THORPE, id., at 31-33.
28. 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 187 (2d ed. 1898);
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of the surety flowed from the fact that the first guarantees, especially
in private peace treaties, were no doubt hostages or the delivery of
goods to the full amount of the wergeld.2 9 In fact, for a short period
during the development, the surety was considered to be a hostage at
large obligated to surrender on demand.8" Thus, the primary lia-
bility of the surety derived from the knowledge that as a hostage, the
surety preferred paying the defaulted amount to suffering the ven-
geance of the creditor. So effective was this system of sureties to en-
force every sort of law, that in due time each man was required to
have sureties."1
Thus the attempt to overcome the rigors of instinctive justice
made use of the very physical violence it sought to end. By inserting
a loved one as a buffer between the offended and the offender, the
performance of the obligor was assured because the buffer would
himself perform rather than suffer the consequences of nonpayment.
This tradition of the surety's primary liability, which had its start
as the best guarantee in private peace treaties, proved so effective it
was assimilated into other commercial undertakings.
Means Of Concluding Agreements
Since the enforceability of voluntary undertakings was literally
guaranteed, the primary means of concluding such assumptions of
liability shared the common characteristic of reliability.
Sale Before Witnesses
Cattle stealing was a social problem as perplexing as private war-
fare to the Saxon governments. The laws as early as 688 A.D. pro-
vided harsh treatment for thieves.82  However, severe punishment
was only one means of offsetting the problem. The other was re-
quiring witnesses to all sales of cattle, so that the purchaser, if accused
LAUGHLIN, supra note 25, at 183, 191; Hazeltine, The Formal Contract of Early
English Law, 10 COLUM. L. REV. 608, 611 (1910).
29. POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 28, at 187.
30. POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 28, at 187.
31. The Supplements to Edgan's Laws 3 and Echebed's 1, in THORPE supra
note 26, at 275.
32. Ine 7, 12, 18, 37 and Wihtraed 26, in THORPE, supra note 26, at 107, 111,
115, 125 and 43.
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of theft, could establish his right.3 Because it began as a defense to
theft, sale before witness has been denied the dignity of contract by
at least one expert. 4 However, such sales became more than a de-
fense to theft when sureties were also required for efficacy. Ethelred
I, 3 orders:
In Case Any One Traffic Without Witness
3. And let no man either buy or exchange unless he have "borh" (surety) and
witness: but if anyone so do, let the land-lord take possession of, and hold the
property, till that it be known who rightfully owns it.:5
Thus, the transacting of business in public was a long-standing,
commonplace and rather efficient means of commerce for the Saxons.
The wed Ceremony
The wed was a stick. By passing it to the promisee, in full view
of the required transaction witnesses, the promisor bound himself to
the undertaking.
There are two possible explanations of the wed ceremony's signifi-
cance. In private peace treaties it could easily have been the slayer's
spear.3 6 As such, its delivery uniquely demonstrated the slayer's de-
sire for peace and his full intention to pay the wergeld. The other
explanation of the ceremony's ability to make a lasting impression, is
that it was a carryover from the Continental festuca.37  The festuca
began as the delivery of a special stick having religious significance.
Ergo, either as a symbolic surrender or a resort to the spirits, the de-
livery of the wed was a grave matter, not easily forgotten. The
overwhelming import of the wed to the Saxon mentality is best evi-
denced by King Alfred's Laws (871-901) where he relates that he
has compiled the laws of his forefathers and states: "At the first we
33. The supplements to Hlothar and Eadric 16, in THORPE, supra note 26, at 35;
Edward the Elder, in THORPE, supra note 26, at 159; Aethelstan I 10, 12, in THORPE,
supra note 26, at 205, 207; Edgan, in THORPE, supra note 26, at 275-77; Ethelred I
3, in THORPE, supra note 26, at 283; Cnut 23, 24, in THORPE, supra note 26, at 389,
391.
34. Supra note 14.
35. Supra note 26, at 283.
36. Henry, Forms of Anglo-Saxon Contracts and Their Sanctions, 21 MICH.
L. REv. 79 (1922-23).
37. POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 28, at 187; Hazeltine, The Formal Con-
tract of Early English Law, 10 COLUM. L. REV. 608, 611 (1910).
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teach, that it is most needful that every man warily keep his oath
and his 'wed' .. "8
Pledges of Salvation
The very real importance to Saxons of the possibility of salvation
provided a basis for two more ceremonially concluded contracts.
The promisor could literally hand his faith to the promisee as se-
curity for the performance in a ceremony not unlike a contemporary
handshake. 9 The required transaction witnesses could view this
ominous pledge, and a subsequent failure to fulfill it would doom the
promisor to eternal torment and temporal damnation.
More effectively, the promisor could deposit his chance at salva-
tion with a third party who would be in a position to coerce the
promisor's redemption of his faith.40 In this form the promisor made
his promise and then pledged his faith to a fideiussor as security for
performance. The fideiussor was generally a local bishop or sher-
iff, who by his temporal authority could coerce performance.
Writing
The early Saxon will was an oral transfer of property concluded
before witnesses. When the Church became involved as a major
beneficiary it naturally followed that the uniquely priestly skill,
writing, was employed to memorialize the contractual exchanges. 41
That the Saxon will was merely a record of a public, oral transfer
may best be seen from some documents themselves.42
The adaptation of the clerically initiated practice of writing, to
the needs of all members of the land-owning class, soon followed.
Documents were far superior to witnesses in land transactions. A
transaction witness was sufficient in a cattle sale because the like-
lihood of all the witnesses perishing before the cattle was slim.
38. Supra note 26, at 61.
39. POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 28, at 191-92.
40. POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 28, at 191-92.
41. HAZELIINE, Comments on the Writings Known as Anglo-Saxon Wills, for-
ward to WHITELOCK, ANGLO-SAXON WILLS (1930).
42. See, e.g., the wills of Abba and Leof Aethelwold, in THORPE, DIpLo-
MATARiuM ANGLIUM AEVI SAXON 469, 500 (1865); the will of Ordnoth, in
WHrrELOCK, ANGLO-SAXON WILLS 19 (1930).
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However, when transfering an eternal asset, land, some more perma-
nent form of proof was required. Similar to the Anglo-Saxon wills,
land charters record an oral transfer carried out in public.43
The public wed ceremony was the keystone of Anglo-Saxon Con-
tracts. By recording in writing the happening of that event, two ad-
ditional formal contracts became possible in two situations uniquely
susceptible to such recording.
Court Record Contracts
The religious ardor of this ancient culture, the custom of doing
business in public and the use of writing by clerics merged to create
another ceremony effective to bind a promisor. The bishop was ac-
tive in the civil judicial system because there was no distinction be-
tween ecclesiastical and civil courts; and because he was specially
trained in a legal system. 4  The fideiussor, or wed ceremonies con-
ducted in open court with the bishop as a witness was an effective
means of concluding a contract. The appeal of transacting business,
with one witness the party who may eventually have been called on to
enforce it, is obvious. No doubt because of its unique enforceability,
this became a popular mode of doing business. Bishops, thus bur-
dened with numerous such ceremonies, used their writing skill to
create a record protecting themselves from doing injustice because of
faulty memory. The making of the court record, in these instances,
became the act creating the enforceable promise.
This brief sketch of the Anglo-Saxon law reveals that their prac-
tices responded to social problems and at the same time made use of
every advanced technique offered by their progress. It is interesting
to note the employment by civil authority of the deeply held religious
beliefs of the people to foster the enforceability of promises. The civil
authorities were probably not grasping at straws by depending on
this abiding faith because individuals similarly invoked the here-
after to enforce their personal wishes. One will makes clear the real-
ity of spiritual punishment to the Anglo-Saxons by providing:
[He who shall detract from my will which I have now declared in the witness of
God, may he be deprived of Joy on this earth, and may the Almighty Lord who
43. ROBERTSON, ANGLO-SAXON CHARTERS 45, 59 (1956).
44. POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 28, at 40.
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created and made all such creatures exclude him from the fellowship of Allsaints
on the Day of Judgment, and may he be delivered into the Abyss of hell to
Satan the Devil and all his accursed companions and there with God's adversaries,
without end and never trouble my heirs.45
Of more enduring interest is the observation that each and every
means of concluding contracts used by the Anglo-Saxon had singu-
lar significance to their society. The public wed ceremony, the pub-
lic sale, pledges of faith, written instruments and court records may
seem rather unsophisticated to modem viewers, but to the Saxon
culture they were events of ineffable meaning. These ceremonies
served to tell Saxons which promises had social importance, which
promises ought to be enforced and the requirement of the ceremony
gave government a degree of control over private enterprise.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONSIDERATION
The classic analyses of the development of the doctrine of consid-
eration trace with masterful precision it's growth as the articulation
of the requirements for success in the various writs of assumpsit4
These studies further indicate that the writs developed in response to
expanding demands upon the courts for justice in commercial mat-
ters. However, none of these studies reveal, except in the most gen-
eral way, the causes of the more challenging demands which caused
the courts in turn to alter their own requirements for success within
their chambers. Rather than repeat the work already accomplished,
this paper shall rely on it for the accuracy of the chronology; and at-
tempt to relate that chronology to the evolving English economy and
culture. It has been said:
The English law of contract is a body of principle which, with a little free adoption
in its formative stages from Roman theory and perhaps Canonist theory, has
risen directly out of the social and economic relations it regulates and is certainly
none the weaker thereby. 47
The soundness of this observation will be demonstrated herein.
45. WHITELOCK, supra note 42, at 87 (1930); see also id. at, 5, 9, 17, 29, 35,
51, 55, 65, 69, 71, 75, 79, and 83.
46. Ames, Parol Contracts Prior to Assumpsit, 8 HARV. L. RE. 252 (1894);
Ames, The History of Assumpsit, 2 HARv. L. REV. 1, 53 (1888); Holdsworth, The
Modem History of the Doctrine of Consideration, 2 Bost. U.L. Rev. 87, 174 (1922).
47. Shatwell, The Doctrine of Consideration in the Modern Law, 1 SYDNEY
L. REV. 289, 320 (1954).




In the earliest years of the Thirteenth century,48 before the emerg-
ence of the writ of assumpsit, the only contract remedies available
to English litigants were detinue, covenant, account, and debt.49
Debt
Debt had its origin in detinue, the writ used to enforce possessory
rights in personal property." However, the writ soon became dis-
tinct from detinue. 51 The initial use of the writ was to enforce the
obligation to pay a sum certain as stated in a sealed instrument.
5 2
It quickly became the means of enforcing judgments, obligations of
record and statutory obligations.5" It was a common practice of lend-
ers in the Thirteenth Century to require from the borrower a recog-
nition of the debt and a judgment for it, even before any money was
actually transferred.54 This practice enabled execution immediately
upon default and thus was a favored security device. It was most
useful to professional moneylenders and accounts for a large percen-
tage of the writs filed during the period. 5
Thus at its inception, successful actions of debt depended on
some written instrument or record. However, in 1338 the writ was
extended to debts on a contract without a specialty.56 This exten-
sion meant that one who obtained goods or services and promised to
pay a sum certain in return could be sued even if his promise was
not in a sealed instrument. 7 Thus arose the classic quid pro quo.
48. CHESHIRE & FIFOOT, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS, 4-6 (6th ed. 1945).
49. Ames, Parol Contracts Prior to Assumpsit, supra note 46.
50. Id. at 4; FIFOOT, HISTORY AND SOURCES OF THE COMMON LAW 217 (1964);
cf., SHIPMAN, COMMON LAW PLEADING 114 (3rd ed. H. Ballantine 1923).
51. CHESHIRE & Fn'OOT, supra note 49, at 4; FiFooT, MISTORY AND SOURCES OF
THE COMMON LAW 217 (1964).
52. CHESHIRE & FIFOOT, supra note 49, at 4; PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY
OF THE COMMON LAW, 633-35 (5th ed. 1956).
53. SHIPMAN, supra note 50, at 132-38.
54. POLLACK & MAITLAND, supra note 28, at 203-04.
55. FIFOOT, supra note 50, at 217-21.
56. CHESHIRE & FIFOOT, supra note 49, at 4, citing: Anon (1338).
57. Y.B. 12 Edw. 3, T. term (debt.) But see: Barton, The Early History of
Consideration 85 L.Q. REV. 372 (1969) for a date 120 years later. But see,
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The writ of debt, by the middle of the Fourteenth Century, could
be used to enforce sealed or recorded promises of sums certain and
similar oral promises where the defaulting promisor had actually re-
ceived goods or services in conection with his promise.
Covenant
Covenant became a popular form of action by the end of the reign
of Henry 111 (1272). It applied, for the most part, to cases involv-
ing land transactions.58  However, the most stringent require-
ment was that there be a sealed instrument for an uncertain amount, 59
because if a sum certain was stated the proper writ was debt."
Account
Although account is generally discussed as a contract writ, it prob-
ably was not."' It was brought against guardians of minors, bailiffs
(manor managers) and agents to account for money due another.62
The duty to account could not be voluntarily assumed, but rather it
was imposed by law upon those serving in positions of trust.6 3  In
fact, the successful plaintiff in account obtained only an order re-
quiring an audit. If the auditor found a sum to be due and the de-
fendant still refused to pay, the plaintiff was then required to insti-
tute an action in debt to enforce payment of the sum certain as com-
puted by the auditor.6 4
Detinue
As stated earlier detinue was the writ used to assert possessory
McGovern, Contract in Medieval England: The Necessity for Quid pro Quo and a
Sum Certain, 42 TEMPLE L.Q. 173 (1969). Professor McGovern quite ably argues
that debt was more contractual in nature than generally thought and, therefore, the
1338 date is misleading.
58. CHESHIRE & FIFooT, supra note 49, at S; POLLACK & MAITLAND, supra note
28, at 217-19; Fifoot, 257.
59. FIFOOT, supra 50, at 258; CHESHIRE & FIFOOT, supra note 49, at S; SHIP-
MAN, supra note 50, at 141-43; POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 28, at 216-20.
60. Id.
61. CHESHIRE & FIFOOT, supra note 49, at 6; FiFooT, supra note 50, at 273;
SHIPMAN, supra note 50, at 144-47.
62. Id.; POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 28, at 221-22.
63. CHESHIRE & FiFooT, supra note 49, at 6; FIFOOT, supra note 50, at 273;
Ames, Parol Contracts Prior to Assumpsit, supra note 46, at 257.
64. CHESHIRE & FIFOOT, supra note 49, at 6.
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rights to chattels.66 As the conceptual forerunner to debt, detinue
had a great influence on the development of contract. The ability
of detinue to recover only specific goods evolved, quite naturally, into
debt's limitation to recovery of sums certain. However great its
influence might have been in this respect, detinue in its own name,
made a significant contribution to the development of modem con-
racts.
In the Fifteenth Century a buyer of goods, who had promised in
writing to pay, could sue in detinue to obtain the goods. 6 One must
note that the significance of this is that it constitutes an exception to
the requirement of a quid pro quo. The justification for this excep-
tion was that because the buyer had promised to pay in a sealed in-
strument, he became at once subject to a suit in either debt or cove-
nant (depending on the certainty of the amount) by the seller, with
out regard for the fact of delivery. If the buyer was to be vulnerable
to immediate enforcement, fairness dictated that the seller be simi-
larly susceptible. Therefore, the buyer was permitted to assert his
right to possess the goods by means of an action in detinue.
However, it must be recalled that the right to bring detinue was
restricted to one thought to have property in the goods.67 Thus, the
rationale became that property in the goods had passed at the mo-
ment the bargain was made.6" The medieval lawyers viewed this ex-
ception to the quid pro quo requirement not as the enforcement of
mutual promises, but rather as the enforcement of exchanged grants
of proprietary rights.6"
An Observation.
Earlier, reference was made to the tendency of modern theorists
to take a rather disparaging view of early contracts. Most modem
65. Supra note 50.
66. CHESHIRE & FIFOOT, supra note 49, at 4; FIFooT, supra note 50, at 228-29;
Ames, Parol Contracts Prior to Assumpsit, supra note 46, at 257. Accord,
GLANVILLE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW AND CUSTOMS OF THE KINGDOM OF ENGLAND
chapter XIV (Beale Trans 1900) wherein it is noted that in Glanville's time debt
was available in sales situations only if there was delivery, part payment or earnest.
67. SHIPMAN, supra note 50, at 114-18; POLLACK & MArrLAND, supra note 28,
at 174-83.
68. CHESHIRE & FiFooT, supra note 49, at S; FIFOOT, supra note 50, at 228-29;
Ames, Parol Contracts Prior to Assumpsit, supra note 46, at 258.
69. Id.
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analysis concentrates on contract theory after the development of
assumpsit. At the very least there has been the continued devotion
to the distinction between formal and informal contracts. It was
earlier contended that a true understanding of consideration (and
thereby contract) can only come from eliminating that distinction.
There is here no intent to recant that earlier contention; but objectivity
demands recognition that there is ample justification for the distinc-
tion. However, conceding that the distinction is one possible interpe-
tation of events, is far from agreeing that it is the correct interpreta-
tion. In fact, my earlier contention is reinforced by observing the
oversights in interpreting those events.
Even the most dubious critic must admit that covenant clearly
required a sealed instrument. Further, account rectified not broken
promises, but broken trusts. Debt itself grew out of detinue, a prop-
erty writ. And debt depended entirely on some writing or other
formality. It is therefore understandable that an analyst might well
doubt the contract thrust of these writs.
However, the greatest justification for a pejorative evaluation of
pre-assumpsit contract theory is the view of the medieval theorists
themselves. They did not view what they did as the enforcement of
promises, but as the exercise of property rights. The medieval law-
yers did not see the enforcement of voluntary assumptions of duty.
On the contrary, they saw only the fulfillment of ownership preroga-
tives. Fortesque said: "If I buy a horse of you the property is
straightaway in me, and for this you shall have a writ of debt for
the money, and I shall have detinue for horse on this bargain. "70
To whatever extent the low evaluations of early practice may in this
manner be justified, the advantage of hindsight must not be lost to the
insecurity of those who extended the frontiers of justice. The me-
dieval practitioners spoke in terms of property because that was the
familiar and the certain. As all men, they sought to step into the un-
known from the very firm threshhold of the known. The words they
spoke as they ventured forth should not prevent analysts from measur-
ing the meaning of what they did. They enforced voluntarily as-
sumed obligations that had not been before enforced. The words
they chose to express in familiar terms what they had done and thus
70. Y.B. 20 Hen. 6, f.35, pl. 4 (1442).
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made it acceptable, should not now be used to cloud the significance
of their achievement. 71 To do so would not only be unfair, but as
stated earlier prevents true understanding.
Assumpsit.
It has been said that the creation of the writ of assumpsit was the
start of a modem system of contract. 72  The full import of this ob-
servation emerges when it is coupled with Maine's belief that the
movement of all societies is from status to contract. 78  The availa-
bility of assumpsit as a contract remedy becomes then, from Maine's
viewpoint, more than a refinement of contract theory; it is a signifi-
cant development in Western Civilization.
Assumpsit arose as an extension of trespass on the case, a tort
action. 74  In the form in which it first appeared, assumpsit is diffi-
cult to characterize as a contract action. 76  At first, the writ enabled
recovery for misfeasance by one who had undertaken a duty. The
classic example of this is the oft discussed Humber Ferryman's Case
in 1348 .7  The plaintiff sued the Ferryman who had undertaken to
transport a mare owned by the plaintiff across the Humber. The de-
fendant overloaded his boat and thus caused the death of the horse.
The defendant contended that a writ in covenant or trespass would
lie, but not assumpsit. The court found the writ proper and in-
structed the defendant to plead.
It is clear that the Humber Ferryman's Case (and thus incipient
assumpsit) was not so much a case of a broken promise to transport
the mare, as it was a case of negligently destroying the mare during
transport. A leading expert asserts that the primary purpose of early
assumpsit was to overcome the maxim "Volenti non fit injuria" (He
71. Professor Plucknett discusses the same sort of verbal conveyance as re-
gards the creation of assumpsit; he makes the added point that the theorists knew
exactly what they were doing and purposely chose the familiar words. PLUCKNETT,
A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 638 (15th ed. 1956).
72. FIFOOT, supra note 50, at 338.
73. MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 304 (10th ed.).
74. SHIPMAN, supra note 50, at 149; PLUCKNETT, supra note 71, at 637; Ames,
The History of Assumpsit, supra note 46.
75. PLUCKNETT, supra note 71, at 637; FIFOOT, supra note 50, at 332-33;
CHESHIRE & FIFOOT, supra note 49, at 8.
76. 22 Ass. 94 pl. 41 (1348).
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who consents cannot receive an injury).77 In its earliest applications,
assumpsit served to overcome the primitive notion that liability for
trespass could only result from an unauthorized contact.
A number of attempts were made in the Fifteenth Century to ex-
tend assumpsit to remedy nonfeasance. 78  However, this extension to
remedy the failure to perform, as well as performing badly, did not
occur until the early years of the Sixteenth Century. When this step
finally came, it came with suddenness. In 1503 some judges still
applied assumpsit only to misfeasance. 7  This reluctance to extend
the scope of assumpsit resulted from two causes. First, judges recog-
nized the tortious heritage and nature of the writ and were hesitant
to hold that nonperformance of a contract constituted a tort. Sec-
ondly, to reward such nonfeasance would be to give a remedy for an
informal agreement contrary to the policy of covenant.8 0
But suddenly in 1504, assumpsit was extended to remedy the fail-
ure to perform the promise, as well as performing it in less than a
satisfactory manner."' And within a year this extension was ac-
cepted with little or no dispute. 2 The rationale for this extension of
assumpsit to nonperformance was the deceit implicit in promising
and failing to fulfill that promise.8 As a result of shifting the em-
phasis to the deceit, the trespass origins of assumpsit faded. 4 The
more subtle deceit rationale, while still tortious in nature, was a much
better bridge to a modem contract theory than was the blatantly tor-
tious trespass. By the middle of the century assumpsit was fully
established as the means for the enforcement of informal, executory
promises, and the road to modem contract lay open.
Extensions Of Assumpsit.
At approximately the same time as assumpsit achieved total ac-
77. Ames, The History of Assumpsit, supra note 46.
78. E.g., Y.B. 2 Henry 4, Michs. No. 19 (1400); Y.B. 14 Henry 4, f.18, pl. 58
(1436).
79. FiFocyr, supra note 50, at 334-37; CHESHIRE & FIFOOT, supra note 49, at 9.
80. CHESHIRE & FIFOOT, supra note 49, at 9.
81. Anon. Y.B. Michs, 20 Henry VII, f.8, pl. 8 (1504). But see: Baron, The
Early History of Consideration, 85 L.Q. REv. 372 (1969).
82. Nora, Y.B. Michs. 21 Henry 7, f.41, pl. 66 (1505).
83. PLUCKNETr, supra note 71, at 640-43; Ames, The History of Assumpsit,
supra note 46.
84. CHESHIRE & FIFOOT, supra note 49, at 9-11.
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ceptance, the mid-Sixteenth Century, the King's Bench created in-
debitatus assumpsit8s The King's Bench fostered this form of as-
sumpsit because it enabled the court to hear cases that theretofore
had been within the exclusive jurisdiction of Common Pleas.86 To
accomplish this, King's Bench offered a new analysis that enabled re-
covery under assumpsit for wrongs theretofore actionable only by
debt. The new theory was that where a debt existed, the law
(King's Bench only) would presume a subsequent assumpsit (pro-
mise) to pay the debt. Once available, the less rigorous practice
rules under assumpsit brought a considerable amount of business to
King's Bench from Common Pleas. However, Common Pleas did
not sit idly by and watch potential litigants take their business to
King's Bench. The two branches warred; King's Bench seeking to in-
crease its activity by encouraging assumpsit as an alternative to debt,
and Common Pleas seeking to maintain its monopoly over debt by
confining assumpsit to its earlier bounds.
Indebitatus assumpsit completed its entry into the common law in
1602. The Exchequer Chamber of all the judges of England, at the
prompting of the King's Bench justices, decided once and for all, that
indebitatus assumpsit was an alternative remedy for the traditional
writ of debt.87 The plaintiff was given the choice of writs because:
Every contract executory imports in itself an assumpsit, for when one agrees to pay
money or to deliver anything, thereby he assumes or promises to pay or deliver it;
and therefore when one sells any goods to another and agrees to deliver them at a
day to come, and the other in consideration thereof agrees to deliver them at a day
to come, and the other in consideration thereof agrees to pay so much money at
such a day, both parties may have an action of debt or an action of the case on
assumpsit, for the mutual executory agreement of both parties imports in itself ac-
tions upon the case (assumpsit) as well as actions of debt.88
The effect of this decision was more than a mere broadening of
assumpsit. It marked the beginning of the end for actions in debt.
Suit in debt was costly; procedurally, debt was more demanding
upon plaintiffs and was subject to wager of law, a practice perforce
losing favor with plaintiffs.89 Therefore, given a choice, plaintiffs
85. PLUCKNETT, supra note 71, at 644-45.
86. CHESHUM & FIFOOT, supra note 49, at 11.
87. Slades Case, 2 Co. Rep. 501 (1602).
88. Id. at 509.
89. PLUCKNETr, supra note 71, at 644-48; Ames, The History of Assumpsit, supra
note 46, at 53.
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would prosecute their claims in assumpsit to obtain a more just reso-
lution (trial by jury rather than wager of law) at a lower cost.
However, the widespread acceptance of indebitatus assumpsit had
even more far reaching effect than discussed heretofore. The ac-
ceptability of the technique of implying promises as a means of at-
taining social justice which was accomplished through Slade's Case,
demonstrates that nothing is quite so powerful as an idea." Once
accustomed to the concept of implied promises, the law had no dif-
ficulty in allowing other such "promises" to be found and enforced
under indebitatus assumpsit. Thus, soon after Slades Case, quantum
meruit and quasi-contract emerged.91
The implied promise of indebitatus assumpsit became the promise
implied in fact of quantum meruit. Where one provided goods or
services for another but no price was set, the courts, accustomed to
the rationale of Slade's Case, had no difficulty finding an implied
promise to pay a reasonable amount.0 2  The first instance of this
was in 1609. 93 This application of implied promise began where the
plaintiff was obligated by law to provide the service. The innkeeper's
duty to accept the guest was matched with the implied promise to pay.
Extending the rationale of implied promise to a situation where no
promise could be found, took a little longer. Quasi-contract, a rem-
edy as if there were a contract, did not appear until later in the Seven-
teenth Century. It was brought to enforce judgments and statutory
duties, or to avoid the unjust enrichment of one party at the expense
of another.9 4 It allowed assumpsit to be brought where no promise
had been made, and further, where there were no acts by the de-
fendant from which the courts could reasonably infer a promise.
The extension of assumpsit to this limit has been recognized as part
of the struggle to avoid the expenses, the unjust and dilatory pro-
cedure and other difficulties required to successfully prosecute a writ
of debt.95
90. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 477-78 (1897).
91. Ames, The History of Assumpsit, supra note 46, at 153; PLUCKNE'r, supra
note 71, at 648.
92. CHESHIRE & FIFOOT, supra note 49, at 13; FIFOOT, supra note 50, at 561;
Ames, The History of Assumpsit supra note 46, at 53.
93. Warbrook v. Griffin, 2 Browne 254 (1609).
94. FIFOOT, supra note 50, at 360; Ames, The History of Assumpsit, supra
note 46, at 53.
95. CHESHIRE & FIFOOT, supra note 49, at 14.
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It was as a substitute for account that assumpsit was first em-
ployed in quasi-contract. 96 Thus, instead of suing for an accounting
by one who had received another's money as a fiduciary or by mis-
take, the plaintiff could sue in assumpsit to enforce a promise that in
fact had never been made.
A statutory or customary duty is about as far as one can get from
a promise. Yet there was little hesitation in extending indebitatus
assumpsit to such duties. This occurred by 1679.17 And at the start
of the next century, within one-hundred years of Slade's Case, prom-
ises implied by law through quasi-contract were fully accepted into
the Common Law and became the means to enforce foreign judg-
ments.98
Summation
The procedural means for the enforcement of contracts evolved
over five or six centuries. The process began with the writ of debt,
whereby promises were enforceable by either some formality or a
fictitious passing of property. The process ended with the applica-
tion of assumpsit to situations where no promise was ever made.
The evolution thus runs the full gamut from enforcing promises by
disregarding them, to enforcing duties (where no promise can possi-
bly be found) by means of an assumed promise. The cause for such
drastic changes in approach, was the equally drastic change in the eco-
nomic and social life of England as that nation moved from agrarian
feudalism to investment capitalism.
After the appropriate form of action for the enforcement of prom-
ises, assumpsit, was created, a new arena for the accommodation of
societal change arose. What came to be called "consideration" be-
came the theoretical rubric within which changed social values could
be reflected. In the next section the evolution of the writs will be
retraced from the point of view of showing how the development of
each writ reflects underlying social change. Then the evolution of
what is called the doctrine of consideration will be examined to see
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that still further social growth dictated changes in that doctrine, ex-
actly as earlier progress had forced the new writs.
SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS
Up to the mid-Fourteenth Century the writs to enforce promises
were account, covenant, detinue and debt. The significant point is
that until that time those writs provided adequate commercial jus-
tice for most people, when one considers the economic activity of the
era.
The Life in Early Norman England
All through this earliest period of contract law, the economy of
England, although indicating some exceptions which were the fore-
runners of change, can be best described as agrarian. 9 The primary
unit of social and economic life was the manor. Each manor was,
to a large extent, a self-sustaining economic unit. It produced al-
most everything it needed, and most of the commerce within it was
accomplished by barter. The use of coined money began on the
smaller estates in Twelfth Century with the commutation of feudal
services and spread to the larger estates in the next century.00 The
introduction of a covenient medium of exchange fostered a marked
degree of change in economic practice. Commerce, as we think of it,
grew. 101
However at this stage, the great feudal estate and its emphasis on
heraldic status, dominated English life. Commercial transfers, as a
part of the entire economy, can be for the most part, divided into two
categories. First, transfers among the lower classes of vital goods and
services (the upper classes received these necessaries by way of feudal
dues). And the second category, transactions pertaining to vast feu-
dal manors among members of the upper classes. The writs of cove-
nant, account, debt and detinue were sufficient to fill the needs of
this era.
99. LIPsoN, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF ENGLAND-THE
MIDDLE AGES 1-1602 (4th ed. 1926); GIBBoNS, INDusTRY IN ENGLAND 65-148 (11th
ed. 1925); DIETZ, AN ECONOMIC HISTORY OF ENGLAND 31-56 (1942).
100. DIETZ, supra note 99, at 52; LIPSON, supra note 99, at 77-89.
101. DIETZ, supra note 99, at 81.
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The Relationship of the Writs to the Life
Covenant
Covenant, the suit on a sealed instrument pertaining to land, was
uniquely feudalistic. Those men wealthy enough to deal in real estate
also had the social status of participating in the heraldic hierarchy.
Their social order was geared to royal pomp and prerogative. The
people were in empathy with the ceremonial facets of feudalism and
understood them. Therefore, to the fedual Gestalt, the affixing of
a seal was a natural, rational and most meaningful ceremony. To
those participants, it is quite likely that affixing the seal was more
than mere symbolism; it was the essence of act.
It is also worthy of note to observe that in addition to being most
meaningful, the sealing ceremony had great social utility. The greater
number of the landed gentry were probably illiterate, so trans-
fer by signature was beyond the possible. However, the heraldic or-
der gave each person a distinct coat of arms. A signet ring was
highly portable and candle wax everywhere at hand. A man with
widespread holdings could readily deal in that land, despite his illit-
eracy, because his seal demonstrated his assent. Thus the sealing
ceremony was a convenient means of transfer, as well as a meaning-
ful one, and thereby promoted the all-important distribution of
wealth.
Account
Account similarily reflected the social customs and economic prac-
tices of early feudalism. William the Conqueror divided England
among his most able and trusted followers. However, for obvious
reasons, he did not give these men one huge tract. Rather, the shrewd
monarch gave them each a number of large estates in different parts
of the island.102 This absentee ownership required the delegation of
supervision to estate managers. Further, the short life span in these
rigorous times often resulted in the heirship of minors. No doubt
guardians were required to protect the interest of the wealthy or-
phans.
The writ of account protected the interests of those persons re-
102. GmBONS, supra note 99, at 70-71; DmTz, supra note 99, at 34-35.
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quired by the realities of medieval life to entrust their fortunes to an-
other. In this respect, account filled a definite need of the feudal
economy. The need to place wealth in the hands of others was com-
mon. Further, it was a practice that was readily subject to abuse.
Some means of protection was demanded of the courts if the econ-
omy was to be maintained. Account was the remedy that filled this
need.
Debt
Holmes divided the writ of debt into at least two eras.10 3 There
was the formal period of the writ. At this point, the major concern
of the law was the proof of the existence of the debt. Therefore, any
satisfactory proof of the debt by the plaintiff (a record, a specialty,
etc.) led to victory. The reasons for success on a specialty or a rec-
ord are much the same as was discussed in relation to covenant. All
that seems necessary to add is that these formal uses of debt also filled
the economic needs of the era. The professional financiers of the era
used debt on a record as a security device. The availability of such
effective security no doubt encouraged moneylending and in that man-
ner contributed to economic progress. The writ of debt was thus a
means by which the government protected individuals engaged in the
essential economic function of providing investment capital (even
on the limited basis a feudalistic economy had need for capital).
The second stage of the writ of debt was the quid pro quo develop-
ment after 1338.104 The satisfactory proof of the debt was extended
to include a benefit bestowed upon the promisor. It is illuminating to
observe the timing of this extension of debt. The use of money grew
rapidly in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries.10 5 Among the rea-
sons for this marked increase were the silver brought from the east
by the Crusaders and the mining of silver in Europe. The conver-
sion of feudal services to money payment placed significant amounts
of coin in the hands of the wealthy. At the same time, it left these
people without many services necessary to their continued well-being.
The answer was quite naturally, to purchase the required services.
103. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW, 213 (Howe ed. 1963).
104. Id., supra note 56.
105. DIETZ, supra note 99, at 52-55.
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In a relatively short period cash was spread throughout all levels of
the society. Money transactions replaced barter transactions with
increasing frequency. So that by the Fourteenth Century promises
to pay money for goods were common; and the need for legal means
of enforcing them, overwhelming. This quid pro quo rationale is a
prime example of legal theory's relationship to economic change.
As earlier noted, this application of debt was supported by a prop-
erty rationale. The concepts of property and possession were fa-
miliar and well understood. The quid pro quo, with its fictional
property rationale, can now be seen as the convenient bridge in the
transition from property to contract. Further, the quid pro quo had
added import to a culture emerging from a barter economy. Posses-
sion of the article for which payment was sought had almost ineffable
significance to those so accustomed to barter.
Detinue
The role of detinue as the counterpart of debt has been discussed.
However, this writ itself met economic needs of the earliest era. It
was used to enforce the return of personal property by bailees. 0 6
Thus, it protected the interests of persons who found it necessary to
place personal property in the possession of others. No doubt such
transactions were not then as frequent as they are now. However, it
is difficult to envisage any economy, no matter how simple, that
does not require some bailment.
From a sociological point of view, the common law, from its very
inception, provided remedies to meet the economic needs of the so-
ciety. The most frequent and essential economic activity was pro-
tected. And further, the remedies which were available were accept-
able because they fit within the pattern of experiences and actions of
the society.
Economic Activity Not Covered by the Writs
Accuracy demands the recognition of economic activity beyond
the simple agrarian practices heretofore discussed. There can be no
doubt, and it should be kept uppermost in mind, that the agricultural
activity of the manor was predominant. The production and distri-
106. SHIPMAN, supra note 50, at 114.
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bution of food was the overwhelming economic concern of the era.
Further, because the social system was also so closely geared to the
land, there was little social status attached to non-agrarian activity.
The lack of overpowering economic urgency and the lower social
standing of non-landed activity, combined to keep such activity from
the forefront of English justice. There was trade, flourishing trade,
but it was of secondary economic and social significance. There-
fore, governmental adjudications of disputes arising from such sec-
ondary activity was outside the mainstream of the common law.
From the very start of the era, the woolen trade was important to
the English.10 7  This trade waned and then flourished. 108  During
the reign of Edward Ill wool fully established itself as a factor in the
economy. When Parliament assembled, the judges were seated on
woolsacks to remind them of wool's importance to the realm.'0 9
Wool was England's chief export commodity."10 Raw and proc-
essed wool were the cornerstones of trade with the continent that
brought iron, timber, furs, wine and beer, hemp, fish and other
products to England."' The international aspects of the trade and
the exigencies of doing business over great distances created problems
beyond the capacity of the law courts.
Domestic trade was carried on in the towns through the craft
guilds and in the other areas at markets and fairs. 112  A market
served local needs, selling produce and the goods necessary to nor-
mal life.1' 8 Fairs on the other hand, served larger geographic areas
and were the means of distributing the imported foreign goods. 14
Neither fairs nor markets were permanent, ongoing enterprises. Ra-
ther, they were held on a periodic basis in different locations. A fair
or market might continue for a day or as long as a week and then
end, not to reopen for months or a year. The contract remedies of
107. LnsoK, supra note 99, at 391.
108. LipsoN, supra note 99, at 391-94.
109. DURANT, ThE REFORMATION 27 (1957).
110. LipsoN, supra note 99, at 391-402; GiBBONS, supra note 99, at 120.
111. FiiooT, supra note 50, at 290; DmTz, supra note 99, at 85-86.
112. LiPsoN, supra note 99, at 196-390; GEBBIrs, supra note 99, at 134-48; Dirmz,
supra note 99, at 57-79.




the common law were totally inadequate for this faster-paced,
sporadic commercial activity.
However, instead of expanding or extending the remedies available
in the courts of general jurisdiction, the medieval English had special
courts to adjudicate these unique disputes. Such special jurisdictions
follow from feudalism's propensity to analyze all social problems from
the viewpoint of status or estate. 115
Towns were served by the borough courts, local courts dating
back to the Saxon era, concerned primarily with local matters."'
The concern of the borough courts was slightly different than the
concern of the manorial court. Each court characteristically con-
cerned itself almost exclusively with matters related to its special in-
terest."17  Therefore, although there might have been a geographic
overlap, there was not much dispute between them. The manorial
court concentrated on disputes regarding the feudal relationships of
the manor; whereas the borough courts devoted themselves to the
somewhat different problems of village or town life.
The dispute that did exist was over the place of the borough within
the feudal structure. This dispute was eventually resolved in favor
of the towns by the ever-rising economic power of the towns; and
thus the boroughs, in reality, bought their way out of the feudal pyra-
mid."' The borough's ascendancy as a social and economic force
in medieval England made the borough courts a significant factor
and a matter of Royal grant."" The development that eventually
ended their prominence was the demand for centralized govern-
ment.
20
A greater number of the commercial disputes were resolved by the
fair or, as they were known, piepowder courts. This name is popularly
thought to be derived from the dusty feet of the itinerant merchants
who availed themselves of its offices.' 2 ' The jurisdiction of the fair
115. DIETZ, supra note 99, at 72. One is driven to observe that it may have
been feudal Britain that gave rise to the apothegm, "Different strokes for different
folks."
116. PLUCKNETr, supra note 71, at 83-94.
117. Compare, PLUCKNETr, at 83-94 with PLUcKNETr, at 95-100, supra note 71.
118. LIPSON, supra note 99, at 191-92.
119. LipsoN, supra note 99, at 193.
120. PLUCKNETr, supra note 71, at 93, 169.
121. Lu'soN, supra note 99, at 223; BLACK'S LAw DiCTIONARY 466 (3rd ed.
1933); PLUCKNETr, supra note 71, at 660.
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court was granted by the royal charter authorizing the fair. 122 These
courts decided disputes arising out of the conduct of the fair. The
non-feudalistic, itinerant nature of medieval commerce, created a
need for mobile, quick and responsive justice that was both beneath
the feudal dignity of the common law and beyond its capacity. Speed
and mobility were achieved by creating a court at the site of the
likely dispute. Responsiveness was achieved because the court was
composed of men involved with the operation of the fair and there-
fore totally familiar with the needs of the litigants and with com-
mercial custom. 123  It is not surprising then that these courts, both
borough and fair, met the demands of the merchants by doing what
the common law courts would not and could not do. Fair courts
and borough courts enforced informal (unsealed) parol contracts
without a quid pro quo.'24
In the tradition of continental practice, the English Law Mer-
chant and Admiralty courts were at first local.12  Each town or port
involved in the foreign trade had a special court to adjudicate dis-
putes arising from this activity. These courts would hear all such
matters, and it is therefore difficult to distinguish the commercial
from the maritime questions. Later in the era as the interests of the
central authority in commerce and international relations were rec-
ognized, the Crown began opening its own courts of this kind.
The early local law merchant took into account the unique prob-
lems of adjudicating the rights of foreigners. In fact, it had no dif-
ficulty in treating Englishmen from another locality as it would
treat a foreigner. 2 ' The development that merits them special recog-
nition, over and above the strictly local commercial courts, was their
recognition of bonds and promises to pay. The exigencies of trading
over great areas, caused these commercial courts to recognize the ef-
ficacy of bonds, promises and eventually bills of exchange as a
means of discharging debts. 2 7 As to the enforcement of contracts,
122. FEFOOT, supra note 50, at 293; LiPSON, supra note 99, at 223.
123. LIPSON, supra note 99, at 255.
124. Ames, Parol Contracts Prior to Assumpsit, supra note 46; CHESHIRE &
FIFOOT, supra note 49, at 7; FIFOOT, supra note 50, at 293.
125. PLUCKNETr, supra note 71, at 657-61.
126. PLUCKNETr, supra note 71, at 664-65.
127. PLUCKNETr, supra note 71, at 666-69.
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these courts concurred with the borough and fair courts. They en-
forced parol, unsealed, totally executory contracts. 28
Summation
The belief that the medieval England did not enforce informal
contracts results, in part, from different usages of the phrase, "com-
mon law." If "common law" describes the law common to all of
England and actively administered in the Crown's interest (i.e., King's
Bench, King's Council, Common Pleas, etc.) and excludes appeals to
Royal conscience (Equity); then it is accurate to state the common
law afforded no means of enforcing oral, executory contracts. Dif-
ficulty arises because the phrase, "common law" is not generally used
in that restrictive, technical sense.
Quite the contrary is true. Generally, the phrase, "at common
law" is used in an historical rather than technical sense and thereby
should include all court systems and courts. Expanded in this manner,
it has been shown that executory parol contracts were in fact enforce-
able "at common law".
To enforce such contracts in medieval times however, a litigant
had to pursue his claim in a special court, familiar with the special
customs of persons who of necessity conducted their affairs by means
of such contracts. For our purposes at this point, it is sufficient to
note that in these specialized courts different standards for success
were demanded of plaintiffs. These different standards were a result
of the then unique nature of the transactions in dispute. Oral, infor-
mal contracts were enforceable in these courts because these courts un-
derstood the portentous nature of parol, executory, unsealed prom-
ises to men of commerce. On the other hand, the courts under the
more direct influence of the Crown did not enforce executory un-
sealed promises because in their role as the judicial arm of land
based, militaristic feudalism, informal executory promises had no
meaning whatsoever to them.
At this point it seems worthwhile to reinforce the earlier observa-
tion of the shortcomings of the strictly technical analysis of consider-
ation and contract.
Technical analysis, in addition to ignoring the sociological import
128. PLUCKNETT, supra note 71, at 665.
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of doctrine, has also generally limited itself to "common law" in the
precise restrictive, technical sense. This limited view resulted in the
failure to observe informal contracts as a meaningful, albeit secondary,
part of even the earliest feudalistic life. From this initial omission
has come the lack of insight, earlier decried, into the later develop-
ments of the "common law" itself-even within the restricted area
to which technical analysis has limited itself. By expanding its area
of study to include the other courts, technical analysis would have
seen the "common law" (in the broader sense) as responsive to the
economic and social drives of the populace. From the awareness of
this responsiveness would have come an understanding of seemingly
inconsistent doctrinal developments. And it might well be added that
observation of this responsive quality of law aids in understanding the
very essence of a legal system having individual liberty as its funda-
mental goal.
The facts are simply that the earliest era of the common law-in
the restrictive sense-could, and therefore did, enforce the vast ma-
jority of its transactions by way of the writs of account, covenant,
debt and detinue. The proof necessary for success in these writs
consisted of facts having great meaning to that culture because they
went to the essence of either the social or economic system of
that era. Concurrent with, but not alternative to these writs, were
remedies in less socially or economically important courts. These
less prominent courts filled the breach left by the land oriented, feu-
dalistic courts of so-called general jurisdiction. These other lesser
courts served special needs with special remedies. It should come
as no surprise, then, that as the unique transactions become the ordi-
nary economic activity, the courts of general jurisdiction absorbed the
formerly unique practices of the specialized courts.
The point is, that even at the early period of medieval times,
there was at least in theory, some means of enforcing every transac-
tion that took place. The only question was in which court any
particular transaction could be enforced. One reason modem schol-
arship has not captured the essence of contract has been the failure
to articulate and pursue this point.
The transactions which are today of great social and economic
import, were in early times so insignificant as to be beneath the direct
involvement of the King's justices. By limiting scholarly scrutiny to
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the efforts of only the King's courts, the attempt to explain commer-
cial law has been confined to the thoughts of men who did not deign
to deal in goods. Therefore, the strictly technical analysis has
literally been an attempt to explain investment capitalism in the lan-
guage of chivalry. The commercial rules of medieval times which are
most informative for the modem era, were ignored because they were
not administered by the King's feudalistic courts.
It will be seen that as the economic and social realities drove
feudalism from England, the King's courts merely assimilated what
had done before by other courts. As transactions theretofore of
limited importance, became important enough to the realm to re-
quire the King's justice, the King's courts adopted the established,
workable solutions. As commercial promises which had earlier had
portent only to those outside the mainstream of feudalism (mer-
chants) acquired national import, they demanded the King's protec-
tion. There was no change in law, merely forum. And what the
King's justices recognized as meaningful to the enforcement of a
promise, changed accordingly. It was old wine in rewashed bottles,
moved to a new cellar, and guarded by a wary, somewhat reluctant
steward.
English Life and the Creation of Assumpsit
It is a great temptation to attribute progress of any sort to a given
number of cataclysmic events. However, candor demands the ad-
mission that social development is a continuum made up of various
factors. As well as events which have for some reason attracted at-
tention, progress is a salmagundi of attitudes, counter-attitudes, emo-
tions, ideas, ambitions, hopes and conquered evils mixed to constantly
varying recipes, but all seasoned with what may be called social iner-
tia. Despite the knowledge that to deal solely in events is to merely
scratch the surface, one must follow those events because their rec-
ord is all the remains of the era. However, as the events are enumer-
ated, one should keep in mind that commerce constantly grew
throughout the era because of the fact that a better standard of living
could be achieved for more people through trade, than could be had
by economic isolationism. Then as now, economic intercourse was
more efficient than even the most sophisticated self-sufficient unit.
At best, the events alluded to give impetus to or provide focus for
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what was in all likelihood inevitable. There is no intention to prove
a causal connection; the mere coincidence in time is sufficiently
illuminating.
The early years of the Fourteenth Century saw England achieve,
comparatively speaking, a higher economic plateau. 129  The towns
had grown, industry developed and as earlier noted, the commuta-
tion of feudal services was an ever increasing practice that put money
into circulation. Of course, all was not perfect, but England had
come far in the two centuries-plus since William's victory. The
fortunes of the laboring class had risen with the growth of industry
and had received added impetus when the famine early in the century
resulted in higher wages for the survivors. 180
The year of 1348, in which the Humber Ferryman's Case was
decided, seems an unusual one in English history. It is one of those
years in which a number of forces seem to come together in a vortex
before thrusting off in new directions. A mushrooming economy,
domestic political contentment resulting from Edward III's need for
money to fight France and victories over the French at Crecy and
eventually Calais marked the years immediately preceding 1348.
Then in this same year,' 3 ' the Black Plague came to England. The
plague overwhelmingly enhanced the value of labor and pushed the
economy to further industrialization as the resulting higher wages at-
tracted the survivors. Although they coincide, it seems more than a
coincidence that 1348 also saw the start of assumpsit, starting the
law irretrievably down the road to modem contract.
English Life After Assumpsit
The years following the first attack of the Black Death were fol-
lowed by unrest and discomfort of all sorts. The Plague itself re-
turned periodically throughout the following century.8 2  The ranks
129. GIBBINS, supra note 99, at 149-50; DURANT, supra note 109, at 37-39.
130. GIBBINS, supra note 99, at 151.
131. There seems to be some disagreement in the counting of the years of
Edward III's reign. Different experts have placed both the Humber Ferryman's
Case and the Plague in 1349 and others have placed them in 1348. I have chosen
1348 as the year for both, not out of any conviction but rather out of belief that
both occurred in the same year and that clarity is aded by arbitrary selecting the
earlier year for each.
132. DURANT, supra note 109, at 39.
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of the English nation were decimated three times over, 3 ' causing
every human endeavor from theology to agricultural to pause, if not
to disintegrate. The cost of labor zoomed and all other costs spi-
ralled in their turn. 3  Statutes seeking to re-establish the economic
stability of pre-Plague days were enacted. These laws sought to roll-
back all costs by returning wages to an acceptable level.'3 5 This or-
dinance was doomed to the same fate as any other act attempting to
repeal the law of supply and demand; it was honored most in its
breach. Subsequent statutes enacted to reinforce the original at-
tempt to return to economic stability demonstrate that the problem
persisted throughout the era. 36 None of these laws had any effect
other than earning the ire of the people. Social conflict between the
classes grew with each enactment. Churchill offers as evidence of
the social conflict and unrest the fact that in the sixteen years between
1351 and 1377 Common Pleas heard nine-thousand breach of con-
tract cases. 37 Whether this proves his point is debatable, but it does
show a definite trend in the law.
Simultaneous with attempts to rollback wages, the Crown levied
taxes seeking to raise funds for further military adventure. Discon-
tent with Church wealth, power, and politics caused further unrest.
Dissident prelates spoke out and were heard by a people fearful of
the horrible death and resentful of the medieval cost/price squeeze
within which they were trapped. The general unrest took direction
and culminated in the Peasants' Revolt of 1381.18' The revolt was
crushed by the brave and treacherous Richard II, who quickly re-
voked all the concessions previously granted in his suit for peace."'
Regardless of the sudden final victory for the Crown, the specter of
conflict between the classes loomed large and real for all English-
men for the next century.
133. DURANT, supra note 109, 39; GIBBINS, supra note 99, at 152.
134. DURANT, supra note 109, at 39; GiIBINS, supra note 99, at 151-57.
135. 23 Edw. 3 Stat. 1 (1349).
136. 25 Edw. 3 Stat. 1 (1350), 31 Edw. 3 Stat. 2 (1357), 34 Edw. 3 Stat. 1
669-11 (1360). 1 Richard II Stat. 1 66 (1377), 12 Richard II c.c. 3-7 (1388).
137. CHURCHILL, THE BIRTH OF BRITAIN 270 (Bantam ed. 1963).
138. Id., at 268-76; DURANT, supra note 109, at 37-48 (1957); GIBBINS, supra
note 99, at 162-70.
139. One expert (GIBBINS, supra note 99, at 170-79) asserts that the insurgents
emerged victorious despite their rapid retreat. This assertion is based on the rela-
tive stability and well being that existed after the Revolt. One is constrained to
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The century that followed the Revolt was filled with internal
struggle for the Crown of England. It featured the famous Wars of
the Roses between the Houses of York and Lancaster and culminated
with the establishment of the Tudor Kings in the person of Henry
VII.140 Industry and commerce grew, spurred in part by the com-
paratively fewer workers needed to raise sheep and make wool than
were necessary for crop production.14 ' The Crown began encourag-
ing industry by taking steps to require the English wool be manu-
factured into cloth instead of exported for conversion.142 Ship build-
ing, exploration and commerce were similarly promoted.
The one hundred fifty years following the first Plague brought
feudalism to its knees. Workers were scarce; they developed wants,
and the realities of production and distribution were on their side.
Moreover, the nobles although justifiably wary of the common folk,
warred among themselves to gain the throne. Their success in butch-
ering each other removed a great obstacle from the path of the rising
lower and middle classes.
The economic and social changes following the Peasant Revolt
and the countervailing protective wariness are reflected in the unsuc-
cessful attempts, mentioned earlier, during the Fourteenth Century
to extend assumpsit to nonfeasance cases. The ultimate successful
extensions of that writ in the Sixteenth Century mirror in the courts
the triumph of mercantilism over feudalism.
The Scene for the Extensions of Assumpsit
The reign of Henry VII (1485-1509) was marked by his con-
cern for commerce. 4 ' He granted concessions to merchants; he
personally financed their expansion; he promoted their interests by
negotiating treaties eliminating tariffs. Industry was throwing off
the traces of control by artisan's guilds.'" The great explorations
observe that tranquility can result equally from either oppression or contentment;
and that economic gain flows more often from scarcity of supply than from largesse
of the wealthy. Wary, may be the most apt description of the English national mood
for over a century following the Revolt.
140. DURANT, supra note 109, at 106-09.
141. GIBBINs, supra note 99, at 180-86; LiPsoN, supra note 99, at 115-30.
142. GmniNs, supra note 99, at 192-93.
143. DIETZ, supra note 99, at 139.
144. GBBiNs, supra note 99, at 196.
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were underway and they engendered enterprise. The merchant class
moved to the forefront of English society.
It is no wonder then, that by 1504 assumpsit was extended to pro-
vide a true remedy for breach of contract. At this point, the King's
justices could comprehend the injury resulting from the total ab-
sence of performance as well as the injury from negligent perform-
ance.
In 1504 the feudalistic Gestalt was replaced with a merchant Gest-
alt. Trade and commerce had replaced the agriculturally oriented
manor as the essential element of English economic effort. Henry
VII, distrustful of the nobles who survived the bitter struggle that
made him King and in all likelihood recognizing the inevitable, be-
stowed Royal favor upon the merchants. These former stepchildren
of the feudal social order gained social acceptance, political power
and economic security from the man who stood atop the feudal pyra-
mid. The common law courts in extending assumpsit were merely
facing up to reality. The informal executory promise of traders had
replaced the ceremonious, pompous, dynastic land transfers of feudal
nobles, as the basic unit for the transmission of English wealth. The
interests of the peddlers had become the interests of the throne, and
therefore had to be protected.
Moreover, along with merchant interests, the common law courts
adopted merchant values. Informal executory promises had gained
the stature and acceptability of the ceremonial livery of seize or
equally ponderous seal. The courts now appreciated the portent of
merchant promises, so they enforced them. Because they could now
fully appreciate such promises, they enforced them exactly as they
had formerly enforced the familiar feudal acts of transfer.
As commerce continued its growth, the Crown and the courts
continued to expand their understanding of it and its values. There-
fore, by mid-century assumpsit was fully established and indebitatus
assumpsit beginning.
In 1558 Elizabeth I ascended to the throne. She recognized
the emerging middle class as a source of power and trade vital to her
nation. In addition to the stimulus rising prices gave to industrializa-
tion, the Queen also spurred economic growth.14 5 She reversed the
145. W. & A. DURANT, THE AGE OF REASON BEGINS 46-50 (1961).
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debasement of currency begun by Henry VIII; she granted monopo-
lies in the production and distribution of many goods. She encour-
aged new industry and chartered the merchant adventurers. It is no
accident that the famous East India Company began during her reign.
Ship building reached its zenith and the English Navy and merchant
fleet grew. Empire and enterprise became inextricably intertwined
leaving feudalism far behind.
The full acceptance of indebitatus assumpsit came with Slade's
Case, near the end of Elizabeth's reign. Seven years later, in 1609,
quantum meruit was created. Notice that it took one hundred and
fifty years (1348-1504) to extend assumpsit from a basically tort
action to a true contract remedy. Once that was done it did not take
quite so long to find additional uses for the writ.
As stated earlier, the common law went from enforcing promises
by ignoring them to concentrate on their form, to enforcing promises
where none was made and none could even be reasonably presumed.
This complete reversal in the law merely reflected an equally drastic
shift in English economic and social life. In the next section it will
be shown that the further developments in the English economy were
reflected by modifications of the doctrine of consideration. The
modifications of consideration all took place under the same writ,
assumpsit, rather than by the creation of new writs or by extensions
of existing ones. In other words, the doctrine of consideration re-
placed the writs as the legal battlefield for the attempts to make the
law responsive to the needs of the people.
THE EVOLUTION OF CONSIDERATION
As soon as the common law began to enforce informal, executory
promises, the question became which of such promises to enforce.
It was as obvious then as it is today, that not all promises could or
should be enforced. The doctrine of consideration became the means
of separating the commercial wheat from the non-commercial chaff.
The actual molding of the doctrine,146as well as the choice of the term
consideration, 4 7 is the result of an amalgam of influences. Roman
146. Ames, The History of Assumpsit, supra note 46; Holdsworth, Modern
History of the Doctrine of Consideration, 2 BOSTON UNIV. L. REV. 87, 174 (1922).
147. Holdsworth, supra note 146, 174.
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theory, Continental practice, Equity's practice and the past practices
of the Law itself, all entered into the formation and articulation of the
doctrine. The best description of the doctrine is that it is a statement
of the requirements for success in assumpsit and the extensions of
that writ. And it is this very description of the doctrine which also
best describes its major shortcoming, as mentioned earlier. As a
statement of the procedural requirements for success in assumpsit,
the doctrine-as presently articulated-is a paradigm rather than a
definition. In its present form, the doctrine merely describes ev-
erything that has ever led to success in assumpsit; it does not give any
indication why any particular set of circumstances were or were not
successful. To determine why particular concepts appear on the
list of successes in assumpsit, the social and economic climate of the
Empire must be understood.
Entrepenurial England
It would be easiest to describe the economic development of this
era as merely a continuation of the transition from feudalism already
discussed. However, the continuing commercial achievements in
this era that the feudal Gestalt finally and fully gave way to a new
set of experience and values-an entrepenurial one. 48 Some of the
more illuminating commercial developments will be set forth to show
the full extent of the shift in the English national attitude.
Foreign trade expanded in both the East and West.' 49 England
traded with the Spanish and English Colonies in the New World.
Simultaneously, trade with India, Arabia and Africa flourished. Dur-
ing the reign of James I (1603-1625) foreign commerce totalled ap-
proximately £ 2,000,000.150 It tripled in the next century; and by
1760 had more than doubled again to £ 14,500,000.'"1 Fishing,
shipbuilding, coal mining, iron production, and other industrial activ-
ity increased dramatically.
However the relationship of foreign trade and industrialization was
an ever accelerating spiral. The colonies demanded goods, causing
148. In 1660 practically all tenures were converted to common socage, thereby
ending the incidents of tenure. 12 Cav. 2 c.24.
149. GiBINs, supra note 99, at 297-304.
150. GIBBINS, supra note 99, at 298.
151. GIBBINS, supra note 99, at 298.
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the merchants to demand them from manufacturers. The producers
in turn, demanded and received better machinery. Increased pro-
duction efficiency created the need and desire for new and expanded
markets. This need for expansion became a major influence in the
politics of the Empire. Wars were fought to gain access to or monop-
olies in certain trading areas. 152  Trade and industry permeated the
national and international thinking of the government; and commer-
cial advantage as a means of national expansion found its way into
the English tradition. 158
Other facts point to the expanding entrepenurial Gestalt through-
out this era. Commercial banking became established during the
Seventeenth Century. 154 All sorts of venture Capital promotions ap-
peared; the wild schemes trading on the successes of the worthwhile.
And numerous books dealing with commercial topics were pub-
lished. The totality of the conversion from feudal goals to commer-
cial ones is best depicted by the almost speculative dealings in land.
The Crown was forced to sell off much of its land, especially after
1605.155 Most illuminating is that this crown land was sold to
London financiers, who subsequently subdivided it and resold. Land
speculation existed on all levels of the feudal pyramid, and the so-
cial exclusivity of land ownership was all but destroyed. Sir Edward
Coke, for example, at his death in 1634 owned ninety-nine manors;
but these constituted only an inventory on hand at the end of his
career.1 6 At least the same number had been bought and sold by
him during his lifetime. Equally demonstrative of the emerging
entrepenurial attitude is that between 1601 and 1640, forty percent
(240) of the six hundred manors in two counties were sold. 15 7 Fur-
ther, of the persons owning land in another county in the year 1620,
two-thirds had liquidated their holdings by 1668. This speculative
approach was a far cry from the static, dynastic relationship with
land that had been fundamental to feudalism.
152. GIBBINS, supra note 99, at 284-304.
153. GIBBINS, supra note 99, at 359-80.
154. GrBiNs, supra note 99, at 299.
155. Thorne, Tudor Social Transformation and Legal Change, 26 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 10, 14 (1951).
156. Id. at 13.
157. Id. at 14.
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Feudalism had interwined political power, social prestige and
land ownership. Therefore, the drastic changes in land ownership
which took place are indicative of equally meaningful social and
political changes. By 1640 the House of Lords consisted of a no-
bility, most of whom had received their titles since the turn of the
Century.5 8 Furthermore, the members of Commons were wealthier
than their counterparts in Lords.159 This greater economic power
quite naturally evolved into political domination.
In this era, the same factors which had earlier forced the common
law courts to reconize parol executory contracts, shaped the emerging
doctrine of consideration. In other words, it will be seen that the
evolution of the doctrine of consideration merely reflects the chang-
ing social and economic conditions and attitudes of the times, exactly
as the same factors had earlier created the doctrine. The social,
political and economic forces at play in Seventeenth Century England
made it inevitable that the doctrine of consideration would become
exactly what it did. This is not to imply that the doctrine is incor-
rect, unwise or unworkable. Rather the intent is to demonstrate
that the doctrine, as the creature of economic, social and political
change, contains within itself the means to accommodate such change.
The Basic Elements
The basic criteria for sufficient consideration (promise or act, bar-
gained for and given in exchange for the promise, and constituting
either a benefit to one or a detriment to the other) were all hammered
out within a short time after the common law began enforcing parol
executory contracts. The chronology offered here is intended for con-
venience rather than accuracy. Furthermore, because these elements
all were evolved almost simultaneously, a chronology is relatively un-
important. And at least in the world of books, if not the real world,
these elements did come forth together. 10
Bargained-for Test
From the point of view of legal theory, the bargained-for test of
158. Id. at 14-15.
159. Id.
160. 2 ST. GERMAIN, DIALOGUES BETWEEN A DOcTOR o DivImnry AND A
STUDENT OF THE COMMON LAW, ch. 24 (1532).
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consideration was created to distinguish between executed consider-
ation, which was effective to bind a promise and a past consideration,
which was not.' 6
1
When the common law had allowed debt on a quid pro quo
(1338) and again when it permitted a prior debt to support a promise
to pay that debt (special assumpit, 1542) it solved one kind of prob-
lem, but, in so doing, laid the groundwork of another. In the in-
terim (1504) it had extended assumpsit to enforce promises where
the promisee had incurred a detriment. Thus in one line of cases,
the problem became deciding whether a particular promise was the
traditional debt on a quid pro quo or a valid special assumpsit to pay
an existing debt. Or, on the other hand, was this promise merely
seeking support from some prior act done by the promisee for
which he had been compensated or for which he had never expected
a compensation. It was necessary to determine which because if the
promise was either a debt on a quid pro quo or a special assumpsit,
the law would enforce it. If however the promisee was seeking to en-
force the promise on the basis of some gratuitous or already com-
pensated former deed, the common law certainly had no tradition
of enforcing such and did not care to do so. The means of distin-
guishing between those differing kinds of bygone acts was the bar-
gained-for test. If the bygone act had been given at the request of
the present promisee it was likely to be the quid pro quo or special
assumpsit situation as opposed to merely a former act of goodwill. 62
From an historical point of view, the bargained-for test first was
pondered in the famous Doctor and Student.' It obtained official
sanction in Andrew v. Boughey in 1553,'14 and was spelled out in
no uncertain terms in 1568:
By the opinion of the Court it (the action) does not lie in this matter, because there
is no consideration wherefore the defendant should be charged for the debt of his
servant, unless the master had first promised to discharge the plaintiff before the
enlargement and mainprize made of the servant, for the master did never make
request to the plaintiff for his servant to do so much, but he did it of his own head.
But in another like action on the case brought upon a promise of twenty pounds
made to the plaintiff by the defendant in consideration that the plaintiff at the
161. Supra note 146, at 174.
162. Supra note 146, at 174.
163. Supra note 160.
164. (1553) Dyer f. 76a.
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special instance of the said defendant, had taken to wife the cousin of the defend-
ant, that was good cause, although the marriage was executed and past before the
undertaking and promise, because the marriage ensued [at] the request of the
defendant.'65
From the sociological analysis point of view it is readily observed
that the bargained-for test mirrored the same emerging entrepenurial
attitudes which had forced the acceptance of assumpsit. The bar-
gained-for test had appeal as a decision making device because it had
a viable relation to the world in which the courts found themselves.
It was, as it is au courant to say, relevant. Earlier, it was pointed out
that the legislative branch of English government had, in this era,
begun to take on a middle class or merchant class appearance. It
does not seem beyond the realm of the possible that the judicial
branch of government went through the same metamorphosis. The
bargained-for test of consideration came into existence because it
gave judicial sanction to the very essence of commerce-the ex-
change-in a society committed, consciously or unconsciously, to be-
coming a commercial society.
Promises
Promises as consideration were recognized so quickly as to have al-
most no history.'66 A promise, as the very essence of the writ of
assumpsit, could not be denied effect in that writ. Thus mutual
promises, conforming to the bargained-for test, were from the start
consideration for each other.'67
From a sociological point of view, another appeal of a promise to
the entrepenurial Gestalt emerges. The merchant mentality is ex-
tremely sensitive to what the future may bring-a serious miscalcula-
tion could bring financial disaster. When one committed himself
to act in a certain way at some future time, he also committed him-
self to some definite assessment of the future. Therefore, a promise
made in the economic realm, subjected to the vagaries of the future,
some degree of wealth. The vulnerability of wealth had ineffable
meaning to the Sixteenth Century merchants.
165. Hunt v. Bate (1568) Dyer ff. 272a, b. (Emphasis added).
166. Holdsworth, supra 146, at 93.
167. 4 Co. Rep. 92b (1603).
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The Detriment/Benefit Test
This test is the definitive demonstration of the paradigmatic na-
ture of the doctrine of consideration. It is nothing more than an
enunciaton in convenient form of the quid pro quo of the writ of
debt, as extended, and the injury so vital to assumpsit, as an out-
growth of case.
After the common law recognized assumpsit and began the search
for the elements bringing success in the new writ, the courts had no
difficulty in accepting the famliar real contract of debt on a quid pro
quo.18 If the possession of goods was so significant to the far less
sophisticated economy of the Fourteenth Century, it is patent that it
would be of even greater meaning in the economic atmosphere of
the Sixteenth.
Detriment to the promisee is the very essence of consideration.'69
This detriment test merely reiterates in contract doctrine, the tortious
injury upon which the original assumpsit writs were based. With-
out such a detriment, success in assumpsit was and is impossible be-
cause without such an injury there would never have been such a
writ.
As were the other elements of consideration, the detriment test
was recognized in the Doctor and Student. 70  The efficacy of detri-
ment as consideration received wide judicial acceptance in the late
Sixteenth and early Seventeenth Centuries.'
It is most enlightening to note that the first articulation of the
benefit/detriment test is attributed to Lord Coke. Earlier it was
pointed out that Coke was truly a man of his time; he was equally
adept in commerce and law. In articulating the detriment/benefit
test, he blended the law with economic truth. When he said,
"[E]very consideration that doth charge the defendant in an as-
sumpsit must be to the benefit of the defendant or charge of the plain-
tiff;' 72 he was injecting his understanding of the world-his values
as an entrepeneur-into the arena of legal theory. The benefit/
168. CHESHIRE & FiFooT, supra note 49, at 11; FIFooT, supra note 50, at 400.
169. Ames, The History of Assumpsit, supra note 46; supra note 146, at 174.
170. Supra note 61.
171. Supra note 146, at 174.
172. Stone v. Wythipol Cro. Eliz. 126 (1588).
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detriment test seems to reflect the attitudes of men of commerce and
investment. The detriment test voices the quintessence of commerce
-invest (incur a short term detriment by parting with wealth) in
anticipation of gain.
A Tangential Doctrine
The development of the law's refusal to evaluate the adequacy of
consideration, concurrent with the development of the doctrine itself,
proves the doctrine's origins in an entrepenurial Gestalt. The re-
luctance to evaluate the litigants' bargain emerged along with the
other rules, in the second half of the Sixteenth Century.178 This re-
spect for the bargain struck by the parties mirrors the typically en-
trepenurial demand to be left free to profit by greater wisdom. The
last thing a wily Elizabethan businessman wanted was to be denied
the fruits of his insight by the intervention of the courts. Social
and political power strong enough to have kept the courts from these
most tempting evaluations, must have also molded the other facets
of the doctrine. Each and every facet of the doctrine of considera-
tion is the unique product of the social, economic and political cli-
mates and attitudes of a nation irreversibly committed to commerce.
THE EXCEPTION THAT PROVES THE RULE
The famous rule of Foakes v. Beer,174 where the House of
Lords decided that a promise to pay a liquidated judgment debt is
not consideration for either the creditor's waiver of interest or a prom-
ise not to enforce the judgment, is the best testimony to the validity
of a sociological analysis. In that case, the Lords did not respond
to the needs of the new economic era, and their own words express
their misgivings. They, in ruling as they did, retained a rule the
wisdom of which they candidly questioned. However, to fully ap-
preciate the forces pulling at the Lords, one last look at England's
economic growth is required.
THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION
The expanding commerce of the preceding two centuries created
173. Sturlyn v. Albany Cro. Eliz. (1587).
174. 9 App. Cas. 605 (1884).
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new demands and new problems. Industry grew and agriculture
became more efficient in response to the emerging realities. Eng-
land had become so much a commercial country that even her sci-
entists were practical men. To a marked degree, English scientists
tended toward research which promised industrial advantage. 175  A
series of inventions enabling mass production of cloth was the begin-
ning of the new era in English life.17  It marked a change of kind
rather than degree because entrepenurial interest and emphasis shifted
from trading to manufacture. England changed from a mercantile
economy to an industrial one. The Industrial Revolution was the
culmination of the economic evolution heretofore discussed. There-
fore, the results of this change in English economic life, brought to-
gether all the factors which influenced contract doctrine.
The consequences of the Industrial Revolution are still being un-
covered. As a result, no litany of changes can hope to be complete.
However, the Durants list the major consequences of the Revolu-
tion. 77  Highlights from that list are sufficient for our purposes.
They believe the Industrial Revolution: (1) proliferated inventions
and machines, completely transforming western industry; (2) moved
economic power from guild controlled home manufacture to a system
of capital investment and free enterprise; (3) industrialized farming
and fostered scientific agriculture; (4) promoted scientific research,
both basic and applied; (5) gave England control of the seas and of
the most profitable colonies. Forced other nations to follow Eng-
land's lead; (6) changed the English character and culture by in-
creasing the population and industrializing it; shifted the population
to the north and west, closer to raw materials, transformed the pas-
toral countryside into manufacturing enclaves and created the ur-
ban slum; (7) depersonalized and made war far more efficient; (8)
speeded and improved transportation and communications; and thus
made feasible greater industrial units and enabled government of,
larger areas; (9) generated democracy because the rising entre-
penurial class sought the support of the masses; (10) forced the
wider dissemination of education to meet the rising demand for in-
dividuals capable of coping with the advanced technology; (11) dis-
175. W. & A. DuRTur, RoussEAU AND REVOLUTION 670-71 (1967).
176. GIBBrNS, supra note 99, at 343.
177. Supra note 175, at 680-82.
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tributed goods and services among more people; (12) sharpened
the urban mind but dulled the appreciation of beauty; (13) altered
the intellectual approach to various problems; economic analysis
of human events became common; (14) the scientific approach so
necessary to physical sciences was applied to other human endeavors
and religious belief waned; (15) the last item on the list is so per-
ceptive an intermingling of industrial and social change that it merits
repeating:
The Industrial Revolution transformed morality. It did not change the nature of
man, but it gave new powers and opportunities to old instincts primitively useful,
socially troublesome. It emphasized the profit motive to a point where it seemed to
encourage and intensify the natural selfishness of man. The unsocial instincts had
been checked by parental authority, by moral instruction in the schools, and by re-
ligious indoctrination. The Industrial Revolution weakened all these checks. In the
agricultural regime the family was the unit of economic production as well as of
racial continuance and social order; it worked together on the land under the disci-
pline of the parents and seasons; it taught co-operation and molded character.
Industrialism made the individual and the company the units of production; the
parents and the family lost the economic basis of their authority and moral func-
tion. As child labor became unprofitable in the cities, children ceased to be
economic assets; birth control spread, most among the more intelligent, least among
the less, with unexpected results to ethnic relations and theocratic power. As
family limitation, and mechanical devices freed woman from maternal cares and
domestic chores, she was drawn into factories and offices; emancipation was in-
dustrialization. As the sons took longer to reach economic maturity made pre-
marital continence more difficult, and broke down the moral code that early
economic maturity, early marriage, and religious sanctions had made possible on the
farm. Industrial societies found themselves drifting in an amoral interregnum
between a moral code that was dying and a new one still unformed. 1
78
Yet the House of Lords, subjected to the combined pressures of all
these changes, did not succumb. And in remaining steadfast, they
revitalized for the Nineteenth Century and anachronistic, as well as
erroneous, doctrine. Their own words best portray the difficulty in
withstanding progress.
FOAKES V. BEER
An analysis of this case is a study of the legal craft itself. It
proves the profound wisdom of Maitland's observation about the
writ system.""s Foakes, an action in modem contract (assumpsit),
178. Supra note 175, at 682.
179. Supra note 174.
180. MAITLAND, THE FORMS OF ACTION AT COMMON LAW 2 (1909): "The
forms of action we have buried, but they still rule us from their graves."
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relied on the authority of Pinnel's Case,181 decided almost three hun-
dred years earlier under the writ of debt. It may be observed that
one reason the buried writs ruled from their tomb was that despite the
fact their memory lingered, few understood their full meaning.
Debt, with its origins in detinue, was in essence a property writ.
It did not enforce a promise; it confirmed existing property rights.
The inappropriateness of deciding a contemporary contract question
by the application of a property principle is one of the underlying
problems of the doctrine of Foakes v. Beer.8 2
Another irony in Foakes is that the Lord's in fact adopted the
obiter dictum of Pinnel. Careful reading discloses that Pinnel's
Case188 was decided in favor of the creditor because the debtor failed
to plead that the payment of the lesser amount was made in satisfac-
tion of the greater amount due. The discussion of the sufficiency of
consideration by the court in Pinnel was therefore superfluous as well
as inappropriate. And when one recalls to mind the competition be-
tween Common Pleas and King's Bench, one can only question the
generosity with which the gratuitous discussion of consideration was
undertaken by the Court.
However, the consummate irony of the doctrine is the reluctance, if
not outright regret, with which it was announced. The debtor's
counsel pointed out that:
There is no reason in sense or law why the agreement should not be valid, and the
creditor prevented from enforcing his judgment if the agreement be performed. It
may often be much more advantageous to the creditor to obtain immediate payment
of part of his debt than to wait to enforce payment, or perhaps by pressing his
debtor to force him into bankruptcy with the result of only a small dividend.
Moreover if a composition is accepted friends who would not otherwise do so, may
be willing to come forward to assist the debtor. And if the creditor thinks that the
acceptance of part is for his benefit who is to say it is not?' 8 4
This articulation of entrepenurial values was not without appeal
to the Lords. Despite their adoption of Coke's report in Pinnel,
the Lords each seemed to desire a different rule.' The Earl of Sel-
borne saw the economic wisdom of permitting such agreements, and
181. S. Co. Rep. 117a (1602).
182. Ames, Two Theories of Consideration, 12 HARV. L. REV. 515 (1889);
Ferson, The Rule in Foakes v. Beer, 31 YALE L.J. 15 (1921).
183. Supra note 181.
184. Foakes v. Beer, 9 App. Cas. 605, 606, 607 (1884).
185. Id. at 613-14.
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even recognized a benefit to the creditor. However, he refused to
release the debtor because he thought the benefit demanded by the
law was "independent" of the economic benefit accruing to a realisti-
cally forgiving creditor.
Lord Blackburn was most direct in voicing his dismay. He said:
What principally weighs with me in thinking that Lord Coke made a mistake of
fact is my conviction that all men of business, whether merchants or tradesmen, do
everyday recognize and act on the ground that prompt payment of a part of their
demand may be more beneficial to them than it would be to insist on their rights
and enforce payment of the whole. Even where the debtor is perfectly solvent, and
sure to pay at last, this often is so. Where the credit of the debtor is doubtful it
must be more so.' 8 6
However, the error was Blackburn's, not Coke's. As was pointed
out earlier, Coke was fully attuned to, if not in the forefront of, the
emerging entrepenurial values of his era. Coke had not erred, nor
had he attempted to stand against progress in his report of Pinnel.
Rather, Coke the consummate lawyer had realized Pinnel's debt
(property) foundations. As such, the question of consideration was
at best secondary. Therefore, Coke reported that the court in Pinnel
was unanimous in holding payment of a lesser amount could not
satisfy a greater debt. 17 Notice that throughout his report of Pin-
nel, Coke speaks not of the sufficiency of consideration, but of the suf-
ficiency of the satisfaction. Nothing can better demonstrate Coke's
understanding of the difference between debt (with its property ori-
gins) and assumpsit.
As confirmation of Coke's complete understanding, is the freedom
he gave his empathy with the entrepenurial Gestalt in an action of as-
sumpsit. In Bagge v. Slade, s18 an action of assumpsit, Coke drew
the distinction between debt and assumpsit with the sharpest lines.
He held that payment of the lesser amount could not be satisfaction of
the greater, but could be good consideration. It seems clear that
Coke had not been mistaken in Pinnel, and Blackburn need not have
gone against his better judgment to perpetuate the holding of that
case.
The doctrine of Foakes v. Beer proves the validity of the sociologi-
cal analysis because it is the one instance where the evolution of the
186. id. at 622.
187. Supra note 181.
188. 3 Bulst. 162 (1614).
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English economy was purposely ignored. And in ignoring progress,
the House of Lords created a doctrine it did not like. Further, the
validity of the approach is reinforced when one comprehends that
the unwise rule of Foakes could only have come about as it did. To
accomplish the anomaly that is the doctrine, the Lords were required
to misunderstand the common law writs rely on dictum, reject their
own understanding of economics, and defer to the superior judgment
of a revered master of the common law-who probably would not
have agreed with them!
It is no wonder then that the rule of Foakes v. Beer has been
criticized and limited to the narrowest possible grounds.
THE RESULT
As a consequence of the House of Lords failing to respond to
the entrepenurial Gestalt, The Doctrine of Foakes v. Beer, or more
accurately The Rule in Pinnel's Case, has been honored most in its
breach. The rule has been articulated in many cases, but so many
exceptions and limitations have been engrafted onto it as to make it
meaningless. 89 The rule as it now exists is a hollow tribute to the
past.
Pinnel's Case'90 itself created three exceptions to the rule it an-
nounced. It held that if something other than a lesser sum of money
(e.g., a horse, hawk or robe) were delivered, the debt would be dis-
charged. It further held that early payment of a lesser amount or pay-
ment at a different place would also serve to satisfy the debt. And
Foakes v. Beer conceded that if the promise to forego the debt
were under seal, there could be no challenge of the consideration.''
Other exceptions demonstrating the readiness of Courts to depart
from the rule are: (1) surrender by the creditor of instrument evi-
dencing debt; (2) payment of the interest in addition to part pay-
ment of the debt; (3) foregoing the right of declaring bankruptcy;
(4) change in the manner or medium of payment; (5) giving or add-
ing to security; and (6) delivery of a negotiable instrument. 92
189. 12 A.L.R.2d 1123-29.
190. Supra note 181.
191. 9 App. Cas. 605, 611 (1884).
192. Supra note 189.
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This is only a partial list of the lengths to which modern courts have
gone to correct the errors of the House of Lords in Foakes.193
American contract law began long after entrepenurial values
ruled western economics. American Courts had weaker ties to the
former feudalistic courts and therefore much less reluctance to over-
turn or at least nullify the anachronistic edict. The American (and
modem) attitude toward the rule is best spoken by Chief Justice
Woods of the Mississippi Supreme Court only thirteen years after
Foakes. He marked himself as a man of modern commerce when
he said:
The absurdity and unreasonableness of the rule seem to be generally conceded, but
there also seems to remain a wavering, shadowy belief in the fact, falsely so called,
that the agreement to accept and the actual acceptance of a lesser sum in full
satisfaction of a larger sum is without any consideration to support it: that is, that
the new agreement confers no benefit upon the creditor. However it may have
seemed 300 years ago in England, when trade and commerce had not yet burst
their swaddling bands, at this day, and in this country, where almost every man is
in some way or other engaged in trade or commerce, it is as ridiculous as it is untrue
to say that the payment of a lesser part of an originally greater debt, cash in hand,
without vexation, cost, and delay, or the hazards of litigation in an effort to collect
all, is not often-nay, generally-greatly to the benefit of the creditor. Why shall
not money-the thing sought to be secured by new notes of third parties, notes
whose payment in money is designed to be secured by mortgage, and even nego-
tiable notes of the debtor himself-why shall not the actual payment of money,
cash in hand, be held to be as good consideration for a new agreement, as bene-
ficial to the creditor, as any mere promises to pay the same amount, by whomso-
ever made and whomsoever secured? . . . And a rule of law which declares that
under no circumstances, however favorable and beneficial to the creditor, or however
hard and full of sacrifice to the debtor, can the payment of a less sum of money
at the time and place stipulated in the original obligation or afterwards, for a
greater sum, though accepted by the creditor in full satisfaction of the whole debt,
ever amount in law to satisfaction of the original debt is absurd, irrational,
unsupported by reason, and not founded in authority, as has been declared by
courts of the highest respectability and of last resort, even when yielding reluc-
tant assents to it.194
The treatment of and attitude toward The Doctrine of Foakes v.
Beer or the Rule in Pinnel's Case as typified by Chief Justice Woods
proves that the components of consideration merely reflect the values
of the society in which gave rise to it. The one rule of considera-
tion that was alien to the era that created it, has been recognized only
193. For an exhaustive study of the exceptions see, Gold, The Present Status of
the Rule in Pinnel's Case, 30 Ky. L.J. 72, 187 (1941-1942).
194. Clayton v. Clark, 74 Miss. 499, 21 So. 565, 569 (1897).
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to the extent it could be vilified and specifically ignored. The rules
which have avoided such treatment have done so because they have
been responsive to the economic, social, political and moral drives
of the era that enunciated them.
APPLICATIONS OF DOCTRINE
Certain applications of the rules of consideration give insight to
the true meaning of the doctrine. Words alone can be deceptive,
but their real meaning can be obtained by viewing them as they are
used. The present words of consideration ("promise, act, bargained-
for, and detriment-benefit") are best understood through examination
of their application to specific situations. The struggle of theorists
with the concept of moral consideration can be particularly illumi-
nating.
MORAL CONSIDERATION
The thought that an obligation of conscience was sufficient to bind
a promise to fulfill it, has been the subject of discussion almost from
the moment it was uttered.1 5 It is generally thought today that du-
ties flowing from ethical criteria, moral obligations or dictates of
conscience are not, without additional impetus, sufficient considera-
tion for a promise to fulfill that duty."9 6 In other words, it is gen-
erally said today that there is no such thing as moral consideration;
or that moral obligations are insufficient consideration. However,
one cannot help but observe some relationship between moral con-
siderations and the doctrine of consideration.
Professor Corbin has indicated that although Lord Mansfield's
rule has been almost uniformly rejected, it lingers still because it is
a means of maintaining flexibility. 9 7 The moral consideration rule
facilitates growth and change in the law and therefore has endured
as a useful tool. And then Professor Corbin posits the difficulties
with the rule in linguistic terms. He states:
195. Hawkes v. Saunders, 1 Cowper 289 (1782) wherein Lord Mansfield said at
290, "[Y]et as the promise is only to do what an honest man ought to do, the ties
of conscience upon an upright mind are a sufficient consideration."
196. 8 A.L.R. 2d 788; 1A CORBIN, CO NTRACTS §§ 230, 231 (1963); WILLISTON,
CONTRACTS § 147 (Jaeger ed. 1957).
197. CORBIN, supra note 196, at § 230.
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Like other stated rules, this rule is composed of words. Like other rules, also, this
one makes an appearance of definiteness and exactitude, seeming to permit and to
require the decision of cases by a process of deductive logic alone. A moral obliga-
tion is a sufficient consideration-as if anyone can and must recognize moral obli-
gation on sight. It is because of this that the broadly stated rule of Lord Mans-
field is so generally disapproved, even in courts where it is frequently appealed to.
In many cases where moral obligation is asserted, the court feels that the promise
ought not to be enforced; instead of going into the perilous and uncertain field of
morality and denying the existence of moral obligation, it is easier to deny the rule.
But on the other hand, in cases where the promise is one that would have been kept
by ordinary citizens, and the court feels that enforcement is just, an appeal to the
rule of moral obligation reaches a satisfying result and averts criticism. It is a
common assumption that moral obligation is clear and certain; and it is part of our
mores that what morality requires must be done. Therefore, in those classes of
cases in which community opinion speaks in no uncertain tones, a promise is en-
forced if the promisor was already under a moral obligation to render the promised
performance. In these cases, we can say with the courts that the moral obligation
is a sufficient consideration; or we can say with the American Law Institute that no
consideration is required. In other cases, where community opinion is divided and
speaks doubtfully, the judicial arm of society withholds enforcement; and we can
explain the result by saying (1) that there was no consideration for the promise, or
(2) that a moral obligation is not sufficient consideration, or (3) that no moral
obligation exists. In cases within the very large doubtful zone, the third of these
explanations is avoided, because the court knows that it does not know, and because
of the controversy that would ensue. 198
This most perceptive analysis shows that the very existence of a rule
of moral consideration is often dependent upon the moral convictions
of the times. However, there is another linguistic dimension to the
problems with the theory of moral consideration.
Analysis of the doctrine of consideration requires a distinction be-
tween the rule of "moral consideration" and moral values which actu-
ate the application of the rules of consideration. Granted, purely ethi-
cal precepts cannot be sufficient consideration; but it must also be con-
ceded that societal moral values have in fact influenced the exercise
of existing contract doctrine. In other words, there is no "moral
consideration;" but moral considerations have dictated what is con-
sideration.
Deeply held ethical maxims cannot bind a promise; but widespread
moral principles help to determine what will serve to bind a promise.
One of the strengths of sociological analysis is that it permits the
assessment of the affect of moral precepts on law. One attempt to
reconcile the doctrine denying moral consideration and the decisions
198. CORBIN, note 196, at 343-44.
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apparently recognizing it has been to hold that a moral duty arising
from what was formerly a legal duty, but which has become unen-
forceable by some rule of positive law, is sufficient consideration to
enforce a promise to perform the barred duty.'99 The Restatement
attempts to reconcile the differences by treating a number of promises
as unenforceable without consideration.'"° Scrutiny of this technique
of resolving the conflict between doctrine and practice by means of
exception will also show the close relationship between consideration
and society.
Promises to Pay Barred Debts
Both the first and second Restatement state that promises to pay
debts barred by the operation of either the statute of limitations21
or the Bankruptcy Act 0 2 are enforceable without consideration. Nu-
merous rationales have been affixed for the enforceability of these
promises to pay barred debts.20 3 Among these rationales have been
waiver of the benefits given by positive law, revival of the debt, im-
plied promise, rebuttal of any presumption of payment, and that the
statute barred the remedy but did not terminate the debt. These
theories seemingly justify the determination to enforce the promise
without consideration and thus satisfy inquirers. However, enforc-
ing such promises by way of exception merely maintains the intel-
lectual integrity of the doctrine of consideration at the expense of
learning exactly what it is that causes the law to enforce the promise.
The true reasons these particular promises are enforced is that their
enforcement appeals to widely held concepts of fundamental fair-
ness.
More precisely, the primary reason these particular promises are
enforced is the very certain knowledge that the obligation in fact
199. 8 A.L.R.2d 791.
200. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS, Topic 4. Informal Contracts With-
out Assent or Consideration (1933); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS,
Topic 2. Contracts without Consideration (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1965).
201. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 86 (1933); RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF CONTRACTS § 86 (tent. draft no. 2, 1965) (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS.
202. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 87 (1933); RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF CONTRACTS § 87 (1965).
203. See CORBIN, supra note 196, at §§ 214, 222; WLLISTON, supra note 196,
at §H 158, 160, 162; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 87 Comment (a) and
§ 88 Comment (a)(d) (1965).
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exists. There is never in any instance a question of whether the
promisor received something. A very human response to seeing
someone (else) get something-for-nothing moved the social order
to enforce these promises. The desire to prevent unwarranted profit,
caused our judicial system to find, on the most gossamer of intellec-
tual grounds, an obligation to pay for what had been received.
Another very human response can be discerned in the enforcement
of these promises. This particular retributive reaction is implicit in
the statement that one who has benefited from the operation of a posi-
tive rule of law may become bound by moral consideration or with-
out any consideration. °4 The debt existed but could not be en-
forced. Society could see the benefits from relieving the debtor; but
it could not help but react strongly to the debtor's flaunting his im-
munity. It was one thing to relieve an obligor in the belief that busi-
ness ought to be completed within a reasonable time (the statute of
limitations rationale); or to relieve him out of the belief that a fresh
financial start would enable him to contribute to the economy and
thereby benefit everyone (the bankruptcy rationale). However, it
was a completely different matter to allow the part so graced by his
peers to increase his personal stature (his self image at least) by
engaging in the bravado of making unenforceable promises. So-
ciety was willing to forgive the debts, but it was not willing to have
its "nose rubbed" in the yield of its own charity.
Promises to Perform Voidable Duties
Section 89 of both Restatements provide that promises to perform
voidable duties are enforceable without consideration. These sec-
tions are intended to bind promisors who could otherwise avoid
their obligation by asserting fraud, duress or incapacity. °5 Human
impulses similar to the ones stated in the last section can be seen at
play here. The law in a free economy, granted its favor, but that favor
should not be trifled with.
Promise to Perform a Duty in Spite of Non-Performance of a Condi-
tion
Section 88 of both Restatements provides that promises to perform
204. Cf. WILLISTON, supra 196, at § 202.
205. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 89, Comment (a) (1965).
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a duty in spite of the non-performance of a condition are enforceable
without consideration. The motivation for these sections, while simi-
lar to, is slightly more sophisticated than in the earlier sections. Here
society recognized that these cases also involved the waiver of a de-
fense not addressed to the merits and one which is also subject to
abuse. 08
Promissory Estoppel
Section 90 of the Restatements candidly discloses their dependence
on moral precepts and fundamental fairness. Their words articulate
with clarity that the criterion of enforcement is justice. The Restate-
ments make promises reasonably inducing action or forbearance en-
forceable without consideration, "[I]f injustice can be avoided only by
enforcement of the promise. 1207
There can be no better proof that the law has been influenced by
social values and moral principles in determining what will make a
promise enforceable or what will be consideration. Setting the avoid-
ance of injustice as the standard of enforcement is the penultimate
recognition of the influence of meta-legal motivations. As asserted
earlier, consideration is, and always has been, a reflection of socio-
economic realities.20 8
CHARITABLE SUBSCRIPTIONS
When one harks back to the earliest contract cases and recalls that
a major concern of early doctrine was to not enforce promises of
gifts, one can see the evolution of the law. The doctrine of promis-
sory estoppel has been invoked to enforce promises of gifts to char-
ity.209 However, a significant part of the evolution has taken place
within the seemingly strict confines of the doctrine of consideration
itself. The first thing that can be garnered is that the very use of
the word "subscription" indicates that the element of bargain is not
present. The singular devotion of the Restatements to the "bargain
206. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 88, Comments (a), (d) (1965).
207. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (193 ) RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1965).
208. But cf. COIRIN, supra note 196, at § 140.
209. See note 5, supra; WILLISTON, supra note 196, at § 140.
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concept of consideration, 10 is the reason that they are required to
handle so many enforced promises by way of exception.
It has been noted that enforcement of gratuitous promises was out
of keeping with the traditions of the common law. However, Pro-
fessor Corbin lists twenty jurisdictions which have enforced subscrip-
tions on the basis of reliance. 1' Other theories used to enforce
promises to make charitable donations have been an implied promise
by the charity to use the funds for proper purposes, 212 a promise by
the charity to raise additional funds,21 the subscriptions to other don-
ors are consideration for the promise in question,21 4 irrevocability
of the subscription offer once the charity acts on it,215 and public
policy.216 There can be little doubt that regardless of the particular
theory used, American courts tend to enforce promises to make char-
itable donations. The true question is why American courts found
it necessary to enforce such gratuitous promises.
The answer is the same as it was when the common law began to
enforce informal contracts. In the same manner that merchantile ac-
tivity became economically too important for the Royal courts to ig-
nore, charitable organizations contribute too much to our economic
life to be left without legal protection. Charities are too important to
how America distributes its wealth, to be ignored for very long.
The hospital supported by donation is the backbone of health care;
charity significantly underwrites medical research; supported pri-
vate education is crucial; and private welfare agencies are the foun-
dation of American social progress. American charity has prog-
ressed beyond the personal benefaction of common law England to
become a telling factor in the way we do business. As such our courts
must be available to it, and the doctrine of consideration has been
modified or enlarged to accommodate it. This doctrinal develop-
ment was inevitable because no society can afford to leave unpro-
tected (nor unprotectable) so essential a part of its economy.
210. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 19, 75(1) (tent. draft no. 1
1964); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 75(1)(d) (193).
211. CORBIN, supra note 196, at § 198.
212. CORIN, supra note 196, at § 198. WILLISTON, supra note 196, at § 116.
213. CORBIN, supra note 196, at § 198.
214. CORBIN, supra note 196, at § 198; WILLISTON, supra note 196, at § 116.
215. WILLISTON, supra note 196, at § 116; CORBIN, supra note 196, at § 198.
216. WILLISTON, supra note 196, at § 116.
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GOOD SAMARITAN CASES
The thinking that a moral consideration based on a previously
received benefit is a sufficient consideration to enforce a subsequent
promise to pay for that benefit, opened another line of cases. In rec-
ognition of these cases, the Second Restatement Section 89A offers an
additional promise enforceable without consideration. It provides:
1. A promise made in recognition of a benefit previously received by the promisor
from the promisee is binding to the extent necessary to prevent injustice.
2. A promise is not binding under Subsection (1)
(a) if the promisee conferred the benefit as a gift or for other reasons the
promisor has not been unjustly enriched; or
(b) to the extent that its value is disproportionate to the benefit.2 1 7
The drafters state that one purpose of the proposed Section is to
provide a remedy for one who supplies emergency services and nec-
essaries. 2 1s The case that posits this problem is Webb v. McGow-
in.2 19  The plaintiff without request had saved the defendant's tes-
tator from death or serious bodily harm, at a sacrifice of his own
physical well being. In gratitude, the testator promised to support the
plaintiff. The court held the promise enforceable because the plain-
tiff had conferred a benefit upon the testator and that was sufficient
to make the clear moral obligation a legal one. It was the determi-
nation that the testator had received a benefit that was crucial. And
it was in this evaluation that the court left the Nineteenth Century for
the Twentieth. The court observed, "[T]hat appellant saved Mc-
Gowin from death or grievous bodily harm. This was a material
benefit to him of infinitely more value than any financial aid he
could have received. 220
This is the identical shift in the evaluation of what constituted a
benefit as took place (but was left unhonored) in Foakes. As was
noted the Lords in Foakes, participants in the entrepenurial era,
saw the benefit of receiving less money than was due; but their al-
legiance to the doctrine of stare decisis caused them to reluctantly and
regretfully accept feudal values. However, the court in Webb did
not fight its values. This court's determination merely reflected our
217. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 89A (1965).
218. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS Comment (d) (1965); see also,
CORBIN, supra note 196, at § 234.
219. 232 Ala. 374, 168 S. 196 (1935).
220. Id. at 197.
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era's evaluation of life and limb. In earlier, more rugged days, loss
of life or limb was a fact of life. But in our century, as living became
less primitive, life took on a new significance. That new meaning is
directly responsible for the outcome of the case.
The continuation of the process of social values acting as the
determinant of consideration is dramatically reinforced by a case
refusing to do what the court in Webb did. This stark realization
comes from the repetition of the same kind of language the Lords
used in Foakes. In refusing to enforce a promise to pay for injuries
incurred in saving the plaintiff from an axe attack, the North Caro-
lina Court said:
The Court is of the opinion that, however much the defendant should be impelled
by common gratitude to alleviate the plaintiff's misfortune, a humanitarian act of
this kind, voluntarily performed, is not such consideration as would entitle her to
recover at law. 2 21
Here is another court refusing to bow to changing social values, but
expressing a degree of doubt. Judges are constantly required to
re-examine traditional doctrine in the light of their own era.
Whether the North Carolina decision will meet the same fate as
Foakes depends on continuation of the respect for life and limb, and
to some degree to the acceptance of the Second Restatement.
A CONCEPTUAL STATEMENT OF DOCTRINE
There would be little difficulty in concluding this effort at this
point. In so doing, the wisdom and insight of sociological jurispru-
dence would be demonstrated. However, as noted earlier, such a
demonstration is probably superfluous. An additional reason justi-
fying the attempt to use the insights gained from our analysis for the
purpose of a redefinition of the doctrine of consideration flows from
the nature of exercise itself. To my mind, the essence of exercise is
achievement. Exercise-be it intellectual or physical-for its own
sake leaves one less than totally fulfilled. To be truly rewarding,
exercise should result in a moutain climbed, or an opponent van-
quished. Therefore, to reap the full benefit of the effort heretofore
expended, there must be an attempt to incorporate the insights
gained into contract doctrine.
221. Harrington v. Taylor, 225 N.C. 690, 36 S.E.2d 227 (1945).
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It is not without some degree of trepidation that such an effort
is undertaken. As imminent an authority as Professor Corbin has
cautioned that consideration may well be an undefinable concept.222
He has observed:
The fact is that 'consideration' is an undefined and nebulous concept. Our efforts
at definition have been inharmonious and unsuccessful for the reason that a great
variety of facts must be included. This is an excellent illustration of the general
truth that we do not have universal principles on mechanical rules of clean-cut
definitions in the beginning. It is evident that we have a strong desire for such
universal and mechanical tests so that we can predict societal action with greater
certainty. Therefore, we continually construct exact definitions in general rules.
Some thus "lay down the law" with dogmatic vigor, even asserting an a priori
necessity, logical or devine.
In all contract law our problem is to determine what facts will operate to create
legal duties and other legal relations. We find at the outset that their words of
promise do not so operate. Our problem then becomes one of determining what
facts must accompany promissory words in order to create a legal duty (and other
legal relations). We must know what these facts are in order that we can properly
predict the enforcement of reparation, either specific or compensatory, in case of
non-performance. We are looking for a sufficient cause or reason for the legal
enforcement of a promise. This problem was also before the Roman lawyers, and
it must exist in all systems of law. With us it is called consideration. 2 23
The desired characteristics of redefinitions of consideration were
described by Professor Llewellyn when he wrote:
The quest is not for solution, when the lines seem to conflict, and their relative
weight becomes the problem for the court. The quest is rather for the verbal ma-
chinery to keep any of them from ever being overloaded, so that the lines of judicial
reconciliation . . . may be helped into that working harmony which cuts down both
the arbitrariness of pure authority, and the unpredictability of the sudden results
dictated by "sense" or "justice". 224
He stated that the goals of a redefinition must be to state:
[M]easures capable of use in case-law courts. That means measures few enough,
and simple enough in form, to be used by men who are not peculiar experts in this
particular field. 2 2 5
In the attempt to employ the insights of sociological analysis, but
recognize the dangers noted by Corbin, and yet hopefully meet the
criteria stated by Llewellyn, one is led to the SIGNAL THEORY
of consideration. It may now be stated that:
222. CORBiN, Supra note 196, at § 109.
223. Corbin, Does a Pre-Existing duty Defeat Consideration?, 27 YALE L.J.
362, 376 (1918).
224. Llewellyn, Common-Law Reform of Consideration: Are There Measures?,
41 COLUM. L. REv. 863, 864 (1941).
225. Id.
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CONSIDERATION IS AN UNEQUIVOCAL SIGNAL TO SOCIETY BY THE
PROMISSOR THAT HE DESIRES HIS PROMISE ENFORCED AGAINST HIM.
WHAT PARTICULAR ACT OR ACTS SHALL CONSTITUTE AN EFFECTIVE
SIGNAL DEPENDS ON (1) THE FACTS OF THE MAKING OF THE
PROMISE, AND (2) THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE MAK-
ING OF THE PROMISE, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO: THE
ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, POLITICAL, MORAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL VAL-
UES OF THE COMMUNITY AND THE ERA IN WHICH THE PROMISE IS
MADE.
OTHER OBSERVERS
The SIGNAL THEORY of consideration has been hinted at, if
not articulated, by a number of authors. The first was Lord Mans-
field. In Pillans v. Van Mierop,226 he discussed the circumstances
surrounding the promise, including the commercial realities. And
he discussed two instances where the technical rules of considera-
tion had been relaxed-both past consideration cases. 227  He also
discussed the social functions of consideration and established the re-
lationship of the doctrine to the earlier formal contracts. All these
factors caused him to conclude:
I take it, that the ancient notion about the want of consideration was for the sake
of evidence only: for when it is reduced into writing, as in covenants, specialties,
bonds ... there was no objection to the want of consideration.228
Pillans was reversed by the House of Lords in Rann v. Hughes.229
The Lords failed to see the relationship between oral contracts and
formal one and thus did not understand what Mansfield meant
when he used the word "evidence". He used it in the SIGNAL
THEORY sense-an indication to the social order; not in the nar-
rower sense normally meant by lawyers. The difficulty encountered
by Mansfield's theory dictated the use of the word "signal" instead of
"evidence" in this effort.280
Sir William Markby, whose analysis was approved by Holdsworth
said:
[T]he form of a bargain, or the giving a quid pro quo, is not conclusive, but it is,
certainly, useful as an indication that the parties contemplated a legal relation. 28 1
226. 3 Burr. 1663 (1765).
227. Id. at 1672.
228. id. at 1669.
229. 101 E.R. 1014 H.L. (1764).
230. Holdsworth, The Modern History of the Doctrine of Consideration, 2
BOST. U.L. REV. 87, 174 (1922).
231. MARKBY, ELEMENTS OF LAW, 309 (6th ed. 1905).
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Sir William then proceeded to the essence of the difficulties with the
extant doctrine of consideration. He observed:
[Tihat which is a mere matter of form has been used for a wrong purpose; that
which is only one out of several possible indications has been used as if it were the
sole test.232
Holmes saw the same difficulties:
In one sense, everything is form which the law requires in order to make a promise
binding over and above the mere expression of the promisor's will. Consideration
is a form as much as a seal. The only difference is, that one form is of modem
introduction, and has a foundation in good sense, or at least falls in with our com-
mon habits of thought, so that we do not notice it, whereas the other is a survival
from an older condition of the law, and is less manifestly sensible, or less familiar.
233
A modern application of a SIGNAL THEORY analysis appears in
De Cicco v. Schwiezer.23 4 Justice Cardozo, in finding that there was
consideration for a promise of support to a couple already engaged
to marry, said:
The springs of conduct are subtle and varied. One who meddles with them must
not insist upon too nice a measure of proof that the spring which he released was
effective to the exclusion of all others. 23 5
In introducing his analysis of "informal contracts without mutual
assent or consideration," Professor Corbin recognized that factors
causally unrelated to "consideration per se" have been found suffi-
cient to make promises enforceable against their makers. 3 He ad-
hered with some reluctance to the Restatement technique of dividing
enforceable promises into two categories: Contracts (consideration)
and everything else (the exceptions) because of the wide acceptance
of the Restatement.23 7  Corbin worked within the bounds of the
definition only because he accepted the reality of its appeal, not be-
cause he felt it thoroughly defined its subject.
Thus it can be seen that the societal signal aspect of consideration
has been heretofore recognized. The fact that it has not achieved
the widespread acceptance sociological analysis discloses it deserves,
demonstrates Man's--even intellectual Man's-overwhelming de-
232. Id. at 310.
233. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 215 (Howe ed. 1963).
234. DiCicco v. Schwiezer, 221 N.Y. 431, 432, 117 N.E. 807, 808 (1917).
235. Id. at 438.
236. CORBIN, supra note 196, at § 193 (1960).
237. Supra note 196, at 189: "The American Law Institute . . . has construtced
a definition. These are stated as if they are now definite and certain and generally
prevailing, whether they were in earlier times or not."
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sire for a definite rule. Legal literature has opted for the certainty
of present doctrine rather than the understanding to be derived from
an accurately flexible statement.
CONCLUSION
The sociological analysis has demonstrated that each and every,
stage in the development, promises were made binding because of
the facts of their making and the realities of life in the society in which
they were made. In each era, a promisor who engaged in conduct
which was particularly meaningful to his contemporaries found him-
self bound to perform. The bargain had great meaning to entre-
prenurial England, but its meaning has diminished in more recent
times and other factors have joined and surpassed it on the list of
contempoary values.
If the law is truly a continuim, traditional Aristotelian analysis has
given us only a still photograph of the doctrine of consideration.
This SIGNAL THEORY is an attempt at the motion picture that is
necessary. The restriction of consideration to the "bargain concept",
has confined us to the economic and social values of a world that no
longer exists. The patent absurdity of such limited thought is proved
by the fact that the exceptions to that limited'view are of as great, if
not greater, concern than the rule itself. And this without men-
tioning whether contemporary concepts of justice are best met under
the rule or its exceptions. Exactly as it is less than helpful to restrict
"contracts" to an area untouched by contemporary regulation;" 8 it is
equally unrewarding to limit them to bargains. No doubt, from such
constricted scrutiny a symetrical doctrine emerges. However, the
price of doctrinal regularity has been understanding and in some in-
stances justice. This is too high a price.
The proposed revision of the Restatement of Contracts is an im-
provement in that it adds to the doctrine of consideration some of the
current factors. However, in the fact that it accepts and strengthens
the basic structure of the original Restatement-consideration lim-
ited to bargain and everything else by way of exception-it perpetu-
ates the mistakes of the past. The time is right to restructure and re-
define the law of contracts in the light of its service to our civiliza-
238. Supra note 18.
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tion and with the knowledge of our attitudes toward it. By doing so,
an understanding of what has taken place will be achieved; and hope-
fully the basis for enlightened future action provided.
